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Abstract
Macroscopic Realism is the doctrine that a macroscopic system is al-
ways determinately in one or other of the macroscopically distinguishable
states available to it, and so is never in a superposition of these states.
The Leggett-Garg inequality was derived to allow experimental test of
whether or not this doctrine is true. Given their formal analogies, the
Leggett-Garg inequality is also often thought of as a temporal version of a
Bell-inequality. Notwithstanding a recent surge of interest in the inequal-
ity, controversy remains regarding what would be shown by its violation.
Here we resolve this controversy, which in our view arises due to an insuf-
ficiently general and model-independent approach to the question so far.
We argue that Leggett and Garg’s initial characterisation of macroscopic
realism does not pick out a particularly natural realist position, but we go
on to articulate an operationally well-defined and well-motivated position
in its place. We then show in a general setting that much weaker condi-
tions than Leggett and Garg’s are sufficient to derive the inequality: in the
first instance, its violation only demonstrates that certain measurements
fail to be non-disturbing at the operational level. We articulate three dis-
tinct species of macroscopic realist position, and argue that it is only the
first of these which can be refuted by Leggett-Garg inequality violation.
Macroscopic realism per se cannot be refuted by violation of the inequality
therefore, but this first position is an attractive one, so ruling it out re-
mains of interest. A crucial role is played in Leggett and Garg’s argument
by the assumption of noninvasive measurability. We show that this notion
is ambiguous between the weaker notion of disturbance at the operational
or statistical level, and the very much stronger notion of invasiveness at
the ontic level of properties of the system. Ontic noninvasiveness would
be required to rule out macroscopic realism per se but this property is not
entailed by macroscopic realism, and its presence cannot be established
in a model-independent way. It follows that despite the formal parallels,
Bell’s and Leggett and Garg’s inequalities are not methodologically on a
par. We close with some reflections on the implications of our analysis for
the pedagogy of quantum superposition.
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1 Introduction
The Leggett-Garg inequality (Leggett and Garg, 1985) was introduced as a
means of putting to experimental test a world-view which Leggett and Garg
called Macroscopic Realism. According to this view, and in explicit contrast to
what quantum theory allows—indeed, more strongly, in contrast to what quan-
tum theory would sometimes seem to require—macroscopic objects must always
be in some one determinate macroscopic state or another at any given time. No
funny-business of quantum superposition is permitted at the macroscopic level.
Leggett-Garg inequalities bear strong formal analogies to Bell-inequalities, ex-
cept that whereas in a Bell-inequality one considers measurements occuring on
two (or more) systems at spacelike separation, in a Leggett-Garg inequality, one
considers repeated measurements, at different times, of a single observable, on
a single system: a timelike, rather than a spacelike separation between mea-
surements. For this reason, Leggett-Garg inequalities have often come to be
called temporal Bell-inequalities, and, as with the Bell-inequalities proper, the
intention is to rule out by experiment (or at least, to put to experimental test)
a broad, interesting, and well-defined class of theories which might seem nat-
urally appealing in some way, but which, on due reflection, have experimental
implications which can be shown to conflict with the predictions of quantum
mechanics.
Leggett-Garg inequalities have been a source of considerable current inter-
est, having been the subject of a range of new experimental proposals, and,
recently, of actual experimental tests (Knee et al., 2012; Dressel et al., 2011;
Palacios-Laloy et al., 2010; Wilde and Mizel, 2012; Williams and Jordan, 2008;
Jordan et al., 2006). Indeed, in the recent experiment of Knee et al. (2012), a
test satisfying some of the important original strictures of Leggett and Garg has
finally been achieved for the first time.1 However, notwithstanding the contribu-
tion of some careful early commentators (Clifton, 1991; Foster and Elby, 1991;
Elby and Foster, 1992; Benatti et al., 1994), there still remains considerable
controversy about what exactly would be shown by violation of a Leggett-Garg
inequality (Ballentine, 1987; Leggett and Garg, 1987; Leggett, 1988, 2002a,b).
The key question, still in contention, is whether macroscopic realism would in
fact be ruled out by experimental violation of the inequality.2
We will seek to gain clarity on this question by developing an adequately
clear statement of what the position of macroscopic realism actually is. We
will also ask how natural—and how interesting—the position thus arrived at
might be as a realist response to the quantum behaviour of the micro-world.
Our preliminary conclusions will be that the view that Leggett and Garg seem
originally to have had in mind—essentially, ordinary quantum mechanics with
1It should be noted that no test to date would plausibly be construed as involving macro-
scopic quantities, however. They have all been performed on microscopic systems. However
the intention is to provide a proof of principle, with the hope of scaling-up to larger systems
in due course. It should also be noted that (perhaps unsurprisingly) in all tests so far, the pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics have been borne out. Emary et al. (2014) is a comprehensive
recent review of various experimental approaches and some theoretical aspects. Bacciagaluppi
(2015) offers some further analysis of assumptions involved in the Leggett-Garg inequality.
2To anticipate: The trouble is not with potential loopholes in the experiment, whether—in
parallel to the Bell-case—with experimental imperfections such as noise and detector efficiency
(though of course any good experimental implementation and analysis will need to attend to
these important features), or with ‘logical’ loopholes such as retrocausality, conspiracy or
superdeterminism (‘no free will’ etc., cf. Bell (1977)). Rather, the trouble lies deeper.
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a macroscopic superselection rule—is not a terribly natural realist position to
adopt, and we will compare it with some better-motivated realist alternatives.
However, we will also show that by adopting a suitably general operationalist
framework as a starting point, one can reformulate the Leggett-Garg inequality
in a natural manner, and also go on to introduce a clear and operationally
well-motivated macroscopic realist position.
As we shall presently see, in order to derive a Leggett-Garg inequality, one
needs not only the assumption of macroscopic realism, but also the assump-
tion of the existence of suitable noninvasive measurements (Leggett and Garg,
1985). We will clarify the notion of noninvasiveness by distinguishing between
two distinct ideas: what we shall call operational non-disturbance and ontic
noninvasiveness, respectively. Ontic noninvasiveness implies operational non-
disturbance, but not conversely; whilst operational non-disturbance on its own
is sufficient to derive the Leggett-Garg inequality. As we shall explain, therefore,
what violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality primarily demonstrates is failure
of one’s measurements to be suitably operationally non-disturbing.3
With this analysis in place, and by proceeding within an appropriately gen-
eral framework, we will go on to demonstrate conclusively that violation of the
Leggett-Garg inequality does not imply the falsity of macroscopic realism. We
will show that there exist three broad classes of macroscopic realist theories,
whilst it is only the first of these three—what we term operational eigenstate
mixture macrorealism—which cannot allow violation of a Leggett-Garg inequal-
ity. The other two classes of macroscopic realist theories each permit violation of
the inequality without going against the view that macroscopic quantities must
always be determinately of one value or another (equivalently, that macroscopic
systems must always be determinately in one macroscopic state or the other).
At best, then, experimental violation of a Leggett-Garg inequality does not show
the falsity of macroscopic realism per se, but only the falsity of operational eigen-
state mixture macrorealism. This more narrow result remains far from trivial,
however, for, as we shall explain, operational eigenstate mixture macrorealism
is quite a natural and an interesting view, and ruling it out indicates that even
macroscopic objects must behave differently depending on whether or not they
are actually being observed.
A recurring theme of our discussion will be the question of the extent to
which the case of the Leggett-Garg inequalities really parallels the more familiar
case of the Bell-inequalities methodologically, as opposed merely to formally or
mathematically. What is crucial to the significance of Bell inequalities is that
their violation really does rule out a large, well-defined, and interesting class of
theories by experiment. In order for this to be the case, the class of theories under
test has to be defined in a suitably general manner—one which does not make
too many ancilliary theoretical assumptions—and in particular, it needs to be
the case that whether or not a given theory does, or ought to, satisfy the crucial
conditions, can be determined in a suitably model-independent manner. Thus,
3A condition related to, but generally weaker than, our notion of operational non-
disturbance has previously been discussed in the literature, under the label of ‘statistical
noninvasive measurability’ by Clifton (1991), for example, and under the label of ‘no-signalling
in time’ by Kofler and Brukner (2013). As discussed by Bacciagaluppi (2015), a further no-
tion of ‘marginal selectivity’ is deployed in this context by Dzhaforov and Kujala (2014). We
will expand on the relations between these notions and our parent notion of operational non-
disturbance on another occasion.
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in the Bell case, the general framework is one of beable theories (Bell, 1976),
against an independently given background of relativistic causal structure, and
the crucial condition of local causality (Bell, 1976, 1990b) can both be defined
and motivated wholly independently of the details of any particular candidate
theory which might be under test; in particular it can be defined independently
of quantum theory.4 It is for these reasons that experimental violation of a
Bell-inequality shows something significant directly about the world, namely,
that no locally-causal theory of the world could be empirically adequate.5
In our view, Leggett-Garg inequality violation rules out macroscopic realism
per se no more than Bell’s theorem rules out hidden variables per se. If there is
a methodological parallel with Bell’s theorem, then, it must be drawn between
noninvasive measurability and local causality. However it is our contention
that, to date, discussion of the Leggett-Garg inequality has not been pursued
in a suitably general and model-independent manner. In particular, discussion
surrounding the crucial condition of noninvasive measurability and the question
of its relation, if any, to macroscopic realism per se has not been, and—we
shall argue—cannot be, made suitably model independent, so the methodological
parallel with Bell’s theorem fails.
We close our discussion with some reflections on the relation between tests of
the Leggett-Garg inequality and familiar two-slit experiments, and consequent
implications for pedagogy when introducing the concept of quantum superposi-
tion.
2 The Leggett-Garg Inequality
Leggett and Garg begin their discussion by noting that:
“Despite sixty years of schooling in quantum mechanics, most physi-
cists have a very non-quantum-mechanical notion of reality at the
macroscopic level, which implicitly makes two assumptions.
• (A1) Macroscopic realism: A macroscopic system with two or
more macroscopically distinct states available to it will at all
times be in one or other of those states.
• (A2) Noninvasive measurability at the macroscopic level: It is
possible, in principle, to determine the state of the system with
arbitrarily small perturbation on its subsequent dynamics.
A direct extrapolation of quantum mechanics to the macroscopic
level denies this.” (Leggett and Garg, 1985)
4By way of example, this marks an important contrast with another recent question, that
of the possibility or otherwise of experimental tests of contextuality, so-called. The standard
notion of contextuality derives from the Kochen-Specker theorem (Kochen and Specker, 1967)
but it is defined in wholly quantum-mechanical terms. One must assume that a great deal of
quantum theory obtains in order even to deploy the definition. Whether a suitably theory-
neutral notion of contextuality can be arrived at to give adequate sense to the notion of a true
experimental test of whether or not nature is contextual remains a highly controversial ques-
tion (see Barrett and Kent (2004); Spekkens (2005); Hermens (2011); and references therein,
for discussion).
5Modulo, of course, some of the niceties to do with loopholes mentioned in fn.2. One
should also note, of course, that failure of local-causality by no means automatically indicates
the presence of non-local causation or action-at-a-distance (cf. Timpson and Brown (2002)
and Brown and Timpson (2015), for example).
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They invite us to consider the measurement on a given system—call it S—of a
quantity Q which can take on one of two distinct values, +1 or -1. If Q is some
suitably macroscopic quantity, then it will follow from macroscopic realism (A1)
that at any time, the system will have a definite value of Q, whether of +1 or -1.
Now consider what might happen if one were to make pairs of measurements
of Q on S, with some time-lapse between the measurements. We might, for
example, having prepared S in some standard way, measure Q at time t1 and
then at a later time t2. We might instead, following that preparation, have
measured Q on S at time t1, and then at time t3, later than t2. Or equally, we
might, as another alternative following the initial preparation, have measured
Q on S at t2 and then again at t3. (We may imagine that there is potentially
some non-trivial dynamics operating on S as time evolves t1 ≤ t ≤ t3.) Call the
value of Q at time ti, Qi.
Now, if the quantity Q always takes on a definite value, as will be the case
if Q is suitably macroscopic and macroscopic realism obtains, then irrespective
of whether or not Q is measured on S at a given time ti, S will have a definite
value of Q at ti, that is, the Qi belonging to S will all be well-defined and of
value ±1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, whether a measurement is performed at ti or not.
Under the assumption that the Qi for S are well-defined for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we
can consider certain functions of them, such as the following:
QLG = Q1Q2 +Q1Q3 +Q2Q3. (1)
This quantity QLG will have different values depending on what values of Q
S actually has at the respective times, i.e., it will take on various values for
different possible histories of S. A little thought reveals that the possible values
for QLG are +3, and −1, as follows (see Table 1).
Q1 Q2 Q3 QLG
+1 +1 +1 3
+1 +1 -1 -1
+1 -1 +1 -1
+1 -1 -1 -1
-1 +1 +1 -1
-1 +1 -1 -1
-1 -1 +1 -1
-1 -1 -1 3
Table 1: Possible values for QLG.
Now, how might these possessed values of Q relate to values for Q one might
measure in the lab, in particular, to the values that might be obtained in our
three distinct pairs of measurement scenarios mentioned above? It is at this
point that the assumption of noninvasive measurability, (A2), will come to the
fore. Before that, however, let us first assume that our measurements of Q are
good measurements, in the sense that if a system S has a definite value of Q at
the time of measurement, then this value is accurately revealed in the measure-
ment.6 We will consider making measurements of Q on many copies of our given
6Clifton (1991), following Redhead (1987) calls this property faithful measurement.
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system, all of which have been subject to exactly the same preparation proce-
dure. Each copy will also be subject to the same time evolutions in the intervals
between possible measurements: t < t1, t1 < t < t2, t2 < t < t3. Notice that, in
general, even if we have prepared all our systems in the same way, and each has
been subject to the same time-evolution before measurement, we may still get
a statistical spread of results ±1 when we measure Q. This is because, even on
the assumption of macroscopic realism, and even given that our measurements
are good measurements, it could well be that there are uncontrolled underlying
variables at play that pertain to our systems, but which have not been fixed by
our preparation procedure. (We shall see much more of this notion as we pro-
ceed.) Therefore, among the experimentally accessible and important quantities
will be expectation values (evaluated for our ensemble of identically prepared
systems) of the form 〈Qi〉 and 〈QiQj〉. We will use subscripts Mi to denote
expectation values determined when a measurement of Q at time ti is actually
performed. Thus 〈Q1Q2〉M1M2 denotes the expectation value for the product
quantity Q1Q2 which is found when a measurementM1 of Q1 and a subsequent
measurementM2 of Q2 is actually made on each element of the ensemble, and so
on. If our measurements are good measurements (and on the assumption that
Q values are always definite), then an experimentally determined expectation
value 〈Qi〉Mi is telling us about the statistical spread of possessed values of Q
in our ensemble at ti, and an experimentally determined product expectation
value 〈QiQj〉MiMj is telling us about the correlations between the possessed
values at different times ti and tj in our ensemble.
Suppose we were to perform three rather than two successive measurements
of Q, at times t1, t2, and t3, on our ensemble. This would allow us to deter-
mine experimentally the three quantities 〈Q1Q2〉M1M2M3 , 〈Q1Q3〉M1M2M3 , and
〈Q2Q3〉M1M2M3 . This would allow us, furthermore, to determine the quantity:
〈QLG〉M1M2M3 = 〈Q1Q2〉M1M2M3 + 〈Q1Q3〉M1M2M3 + 〈Q2Q3〉M1M2M3 . (2)
Since the possible values of QLG for a single system, are, as we know, either +3
or -1, then the expectation value for the ensemble must be bounded by these
values:
− 1 ≤ 〈QLG〉M1M2M3 ≤ 3. (3)
An important subtlety enters at this point. When all three measurements
M1,M2,M3 are actually successively performed on each element of the ensem-
ble, then we do not need to assume that Q has definite possessed values prior
to each measurement, which are then revealed in measurement, in order to
know that inequality (3) obtains. We can equally well think (mathematically)
of the entries in Table 1 as representing the outcomes of actually performed
measurements, as opposed to prior possessed values. On either understanding
of the quantities involved, QLG will be well-defined, though the meaning of the
quantities is crucially different in the two cases.
The Leggett-Garg inequality finally comes into view when we introduce the
assumption of noninvasive measurability. When all three measurementsM1,M2
andM3 are performed, since each measurement has a definite outcome of either
+1 or -1, inequality (3) must always hold. The bound will be satisfied in quan-
tum theory, in any macroscopic realist theory, and indeed in any other theory at
all which defines joint probabilities of outcomes for a sequence of actually per-
formed measurements! (This is a very large class of theories.) But now imagine
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that both macroscopic realism obtains and that it is possible to perform the first
and second measurements of Q noninvasively. If both M1 and M2 are merely, if
performed, accurately revealing a previously possessed value, and in so doing,
are not at all affecting the future evolution of that value, then it will not make
any difference to the possessed values later accurately revealed whether or not
these measurements M1 or M2 were in fact performed. It follows that under
these assumptions, the expectation value 〈Q1Q3〉 experimentally obtained when
only M1 and M3 are performed should be the same as that which would have
been obtained if all of M1,M2, and M3 had been performed; and similarly, the
expectation value 〈Q2Q3〉 obtained when onlyM2 andM3 are performed should
be the same as that which would have been obtained if all of M1,M2 and M3
had been performed. Finally, by appealing to the fact that M3, if performed, is
after M2, and so it shouldn’t make a difference to things that happened before
it, one can conclude that there should be no difference in the value of 〈Q1Q2〉
experimentally obtained if one were just to perform M1 and M2, and leave out
M3.
With these equalities in place, we derive from (3) the conclusion that:
− 1 ≤ 〈Q1Q2〉M1M2 + 〈Q1Q3〉M1M3 + 〈Q2Q3〉M2M3 ≤ 3. (4)
This is the Leggett-Garg inequality, in one of its standard forms. Unlike the
trivial (3) which brings out an entirely straightforward feature of a single experi-
mental set-up, (4) relates in a highly non-trivial way three distinct experimental
set-ups: the case in which we measure Q at t1 and t2, the case in which we mea-
sure Q at t1 and t3, and the case in which we measure Q at t2 and t3. There is no
reason at all to suppose that this inequality will hold in general theories, indeed,
every reason to suppose it will not. But as we have seen, it will be satisfied
if the special conditions of macroscopic realism and noninvasive measurability
hold.7 Leggett and Garg (1985) go on to show that it can readily be violated
in quantum mechanics, and values less than -1 obtained.
The kind of physical system which Leggett and Garg originally proposed as
an interesting candidate for investigating whether or not their inequality held
was an rf SQUID (superconducting quantum interference device), i.e., a ring of
superconductor (some millimeters in diameter) with a single Josephson junction,
immersed in an external electromagnetic field. In such a device one can have the
current in the superconductor circulating clockwise (label it +1) and one can
have it circulating anti-clockwise (label it -1). Since the current (of the order of
a few microamperes) involves a very large number of charge carriers in motion,
it can plausibly be construed as in some relevant sense macroscopic. Quantum
mechanics assigns orthogonal states |+1〉 and |−1〉 to these two distinct current
states, and it will of course allow superpositions of such states: α|+1〉+β|−1〉.
Macroscopic realism, Leggett and Garg suggest, would require that the SQUID
is only ever in one or other of the two distinct current states. The recent tests
of the Leggett-Garg inequality mentioned above have explored other kinds of
systems.
Leggett and Garg’s derivation of their inequality, as above, uses, as we
have seen, both the assumption of macroscopic realism, and the assumption
7Note for completeness that the derivation of (4) does not fundamentally require that Q be
a macroscopic quantity. This only enters if the condition that Q must always have a definite
value is to be derived from the assumption of macroscopic realism. One might proceed instead
simply by assuming directly that Q always takes on definite values.
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of noninvasive measurability. Whilst Leggett and Garg note that noninva-
sive measurability does not logically follow as a consequence of macroscopic
realism, they try to argue that it is nonetheless ‘extremely natural and plau-
sible’ (Leggett and Garg, 1985) and moreover, they repeatedly assert—more
strongly—that it is such a natural corollary of macroscopic realism per se that
‘the latter is virtually meaningless in its absence’ (Leggett, 2002b, p.R449),
cf. also Leggett (1988, p.949). They motivate this thought by inviting us to
consider ideal negative result or null-result measurements.
Suppose that there is some way of measuring Q which proceeds as follows:
one has a measuring device which one knows will interact with the target system
only if the target system is definitely in some one particular state of Q—say,
only if Q = +1—and it will not interact at all with the target system otherwise.
If the system does have Q = +1, then the measuring device will reliably indicate
this (it is a good measuring device, in the sense used before). Then suppose that
macroscopic realism obtains and that one’s target system to be measured enters
this measuring device. If the device registers an outcome, we know that we are
accurately revealing a pre-existing possessed value of Q (since we are assuming
macroscopic realism, and the measurement is a good one) but our measurement
may well disturb that value and its subsequent evolution. However, if the device
(assumed to be working properly) does not register an outcome, we can infer
that the value of Q is -1, for if it had been +1 the device would have registered,
yet it did not; and +1 and -1 are the only two options. Yet the value of Q
cannot have been disturbed in this measurement, since we know ex hypothesi
that no interaction took place. This is a null-result measurement. The fact that
nothing happened allows us to infer the value of Q, whilst the fact that nothing
happened also guarantees that our learning this value does not affect the target
system, thus does not affect the value of Q, or its subsequent evolution.
Notice that in this argument, the possibility of measuring Q noninvasively is
derived from the conjunction of macroscopic realism with the assumption of the
existence of suitable null-result measurements for Q. We shall return to exam-
ine in detail these arguments surrounding the connection between macroscopic
realism and noninvasive measurability.
3 What is macrorealism? First pass
We have seen how the Leggett-Garg inequality (4) is supposed to function as a
test for macroscopic realism. With noninvasive measurability a natural corol-
lary of macroscopic realism, and the pair of macroscopic realism and noninvasive
measurability together entailing the Leggett-Garg inequality, experimental vio-
lation of the inequality would defeat the macroscopic realist picture. But what
exactly is macroscopic realism, and how realistic a realism is it, in fact? These
are the questions to which we now turn.
At first blush, the statement of macroscopic realism (A1) above might seem
perfectly clear—given a macroscopic system with two or more macroscopically
distinct states available to it, it will at all times be in one or other of those states.
But further reflection must give us pause. One might well be concerned with
what exactly is meant by, or what would count as being, ‘macroscopic’, whether
a macroscopic system, or a macroscopically distinct state. This concern, whilst
real enough, is not our immediate object, however. Rather, our first concern is
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the perhaps more subtle question of what is meant by state in ‘macroscopically
distinct states’. What conception of the state of a system are we operating with?
Usually, the notion of state comes as part of a theory, or as part of a general
framework of theories. What background theory, or framework of theories, are
we considering here?
Leggett and Garg’s discussion strongly suggests that their background frame-
work is simply quantum mechanical Hilbert space states. Macroscopic states are
the quantum states that one would assign to macroscopic, or collective, degrees
of freedom. Thus, in a SQUID, one does not trouble to assign a (massively
entangled) multi-particle quantum state to the enormous number of individ-
ual microscopic charge-carriers, rather one simply assigns a single state to the
collective degree of freedom, the direction of the current, e.g., | + 1〉 or | − 1〉.
The content of macroscopic realism is then that the only permissible states of
the SQUID are the quantum states | + 1〉 and | − 1〉 (and statistical mixtures
thereof), quantum superpositions of these two states being disallowed.
This reading, according to which macroscopic realism is simply quantum
theory subject to a macroscopic superselection rule which forbids superposition
in certain regimes, emerges perhaps most clearly in the following passage of
Leggett’s:
“...it seems clear that most if not all [criteria for macroscopicness]
will have the property that the specific properties of a measuring
apparatus as such are irrelevant to its allocation to the ‘macro-
scopic’ side of the divide; what is relevant is that the different final
states of the apparatus are macroscopically distinguishable. Thus,
we would expect that such theories would have the general feature
that Nature, while known to tolerate linear superpositions at the
atomic level, cannot tolerate quantum superpositions of macroscopi-
cally distinct states, whether or not these have anything to do with
that small class of physical objects designed by human beings to act
as measuring apparatus, but rather always selects a definite macro-
scopic state. Let us call this hypothesis for brevity ‘macrorealism’.”
(Leggett, 1988, p.943)
He goes on:
“the hypothesis that Nature does not tolerate linear superpositions
of macroscopically distinct states (‘macrorealism’) is in principle sub-
ject to experimental test.” (Leggett, 1988, p.944)
It seems that we are in the realm of applying quantum states to describe physical
systems, it’s just that not all the usual states in the Hilbert space are permitted
as physical. (It may be that we do not always get a new physical state by adding
together two of the old ones; but the old ones—the items one is contemplating
adding together—are themselves quantum states.)
However, if macroscopic realism is simply quantum theory with a macro-
scopic superselection rule, then we must note the following essential point:
There is nothing realist about denying the existence of superpositions,
macroscopic or otherwise.
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Denying the physical possibility of quantum superposition (micro or macro) is
neither necessary nor sufficient for realism, and it is not necessary in order to ac-
count for our determinate experience of the independently existing macroscopic
world which surrounds us. Let us flesh this thought out.
To clarify terms, we take realism in the philosophy of science to be the famil-
iar view—in brief—that our theories seek to give us a literally true description
of what the world is like, both in its directly observable and its non-directly
observable features; that the empirical success of our theories gives us good rea-
son to believe (defeasible, but nonetheless prima facie good, reason to believe)
that our theories are true or approximately true; and that the statements of our
theories are true or false in virtue of mind-independent facts about the world.
As applied to quantum theory, realism requires that we interpret the quantum
formalism (or at least some significant part of it) as directly representing facts
about the physical world. Moreover, since quantum mechanics is a fundamen-
tal theory, its scope, according to standard realism, should be considered as
universal: it is apt, in principle at least, to describe the whole physical world,
seamlessly, and all in one go. Furthermore, we should adopt an unassuming
physicalism: reference to observers should play no role except in so far as we
model these entities as physical systems within the theory;8 and more generally,
we should grant big things to be made of little things, and insist that the laws,
or other robust generalisations (if any), governing the behaviour of big things be
consistent with the laws stipulated for little things: in this instance, consistent
with the quantum laws governing the behaviour of the microscopic.
Now: One could deny superposition and yet fail to be a realist simply because
one’s general view was not a realist one. For example, perhaps one maintains
that one’s theory (quantum theory with a superselection rule) is not descriptive
of anything apart from what the results of experiments would be, characterised
at the level of the directly observable. (This would be an instrumentalist view,
according to which one’s theory is just an algorithm for organising observable
data, rather than a set of claims about how the world fundamentally is below the
level of immediate observation). Or again, perhaps one might endorse the truly
radical view that mind-independence fails, leading to some form of idealism or
phenomenalism. Or one might deny some other component of the standard
realist picture.
More significant than this failure of sufficiency, however, is the fact that de-
nial of superposition is not necessary for realism: one can seek to incorporate
superposition, including macroscopic superposition, into one’s realist, descrip-
tive, account of how the mind-independent world is—incorporate it, moreover,
in such a way as to recover the determinate nature of our experience, and of the
macroscopic world. There are, of course, a number of well-developed approaches
to interpreting quantum mechanics which adopt just this approach, and which
are fully realist in the ways described above. We will focus initially on two key
examples.
Consider first, then, the de Broglie–Bohm theory (de Broglie, 1927; Bohm,
1952; Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Holland, 1995). This is a theory in which the
wavefunction for the total system (up to and including the entire universe)
always evolves unitarily (thus superposition, and macroscopic superposition, is
8Leggett effectively makes this same point in the first part of the quotation above (Leggett,
1988, p.943). Cf. also, famously, Bell (1990a).
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rife) but it is supplemented with the specification of definite positions at all
times for particles. Momenta for these particles are also well-defined at all
times (thus, all particles enjoy continuous and deterministic trajectories), and
these momenta are determined by taking the gradient of the phase of the many-
body wavefunction; in other words, the wavefunction is directly involved in
pushing particles around. This is a deterministic hidden variable theory (the
hidden variables are the particle positions, or more generally, configurations for
physical degrees of freedom) and it is empirically equivalent to quantum theory,
on the assumption (which may be stipulated or derived) that the probability
distribution over initial configurations (understood merely as ignorance of the
initial configuration) is given by the Born rule. (This is the assumption of the
obtaining of quantum equilibrium, as per Valentini (1991a,b), for example.) In
this theory, the results of measurements are uniquely determined given the initial
configuration of the total system, the initial wavefunction, and the interaction
Hamiltonian between measuring device and system measured. In this theory,
one can have a wavefunction which is in a superposition, yet the values for
physical quantities for the system take on definite values. For example, one’s
system of interest might be in a superposition of being here and there (where
here and there are potentially a macroscopically large distance apart)—that
is, the wavefunction has non-zero support in both these two widely distinct
regions of configuration space—yet the system is definitely in one or other of
the two places, as stipulated by the additional specification of the particle’s (or
particles’) position(s).
The de Broglie–Bohm theory, then, is troubling from the point of view of
our initial characterisation, following Leggett and Garg, of macroscopic realism.
For this is a theory which allows macroscopic superposition, but yet, at the
same time, also allows that the associated macroscopic physical variables take
on definite values at all times. We conclude two things immediately, and notice
a third.
First, one can evidently be a realist without denying superposition: the
de Broglie–Bohm theory illustrates how superposition in the quantum state
(including at the macroscopic level) need not lead to indefiniteness of physi-
cal variables. Second, and consequently, there must be something wrong with
Leggett and Garg’s conception of macroscopic realism as being the denial of the
possibility of superposition (equivalently, being the assertion of quantum theory
with a superselection rule). For, by one perfectly good rendering of the notion
of ‘being in a definite macroscopically distinct state’, the de Broglie–Bohm the-
ory will allow that one’s system is in a definite (macroscopically distinct) state,
viz., being either here or there, while yet it insists that one’s system is also
in a quantum superposition. Third, we notice that the de Broglie–Bohm the-
ory will evidently violate a Leggett-Garg inequality whenever quantum theory
does, for de Broglie–Bohm theory is empirically equivalent to ordinary quantum
theory (given quantum equilibrium obtains), yet it also, on the broader notion
of macroscopic realism just delineated (definite values for macroscopic physical
quantities), counts as being a macroscopic realist theory. So, the relationship
between macroscopic realism and the necessity of satisfying a Leggett-Garg in-
equality is thrown into doubt.
Now let us consider another very well-developed version of quantum mechan-
ical realism: the Everett interpretation (Everett, 1957; Saunders et al., 2010;
Wallace, 2012). In this theory, as in de Broglie–Bohm, one entertains a wave-
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function for the total system (up to and including the whole universe), again
evolving purely unitarily. Here, however, one does not introduce further supple-
mentary quantities, but argues instead that the unitarily evolving wavefunction
on its own, construed realistically as directly representing a component of real-
ity (a kind of non-separable field on four-dimensional spacetime, or a separable
field on a very much higher-dimensional physical space (Wallace and Timpson,
2010)) is enough (given the contingent details of typical dynamics) to underpin
emergent macroscopic definiteness: an emergent plurality of effectively non-
interacting—thus independent—macroscopic worlds of determinate character;
and correspondingly, is enough (on its own) to underpin the emergence of con-
crete observers, each having definite experiences, within these macroscopically
definite (up to decoherence) worlds (Wallace, 2012).
The Everett interpretation shows us that we can have quantum realism with-
out the denial of superposition. It shows us, moreover, that we can have quan-
tum realism without macroscopic realism, even in the broader notion of macro-
scopic realism which consideration of the de Broglie-Bohm theory encouraged.
Everett gives us realism about the macroscopic without macroscopic realism—in
either the narrow Leggett-Garg sense of quantum mechanics with a superselec-
tion rule, or in the broader sense of macroscopic physical quantities always
taking on a definite value.9
These reflections lead us to proffer a further slogan:
Macroscopic realism is not equivalent to realism about the macro-
scopic.
The de Broglie–Bohm theory shows us that the narrow initial Leggett-Garg
characterisation of macroscopic realism as quantum theory with a superselec-
tion rule falls short of capturing the full notion of realism about the macroscopic
(not to say, realism at all levels of description), whilst the Everett interpreta-
tion (in its modern formulations, due primarily to Saunders and Wallace) shows
that even the broadened notion of macroscopic realism (definite values for macro-
scopic physical quantities) falls short of capturing the notion of realism about
the macroscopic.
Regarding the Leggett-Garg inequality: it is obvious that the Everett inter-
pretation allows violation of the inequality, however at the same time, it delivers
determinate macroscopic worlds and determinate experience of those worlds.
An alternative approach to quantum-mechanical realism is to assert the re-
ality of the quantum state, as in de Broglie–Bohm theory and Everett, but
to deny that the dynamics of the total system is always purely unitary. The-
ories in this class are realist wavefunction collapse theories, which postulate
some additional term (or terms) in the law describing the evolution of micro-
scopic systems, whose intended effect is to kill-off superposition between terms
when it might seem that that’s required in order to give a definite result of an
experiment—or more generally, to leave the macroscopic world in a determinate
(non-superposed) state—but which have very little effect on microscopic super-
positions. The Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory (Ghirardi et al., 1986) is
a well-known example of such an approach, one of the earliest to be constructed.
9Everett offers us only the relative states being definite, or only relative quantities taking
on a definite value, not the quantities tout court.
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Concrete examples of realist collapse theories, such as GRW, will fall under
the heading of Leggett and Garg’s original notion of macroscopic realism, and in-
deed, it is quite natural to take this class of theories to be just what Leggett and
Garg originally had in mind. In these theories, the additional dynamical terms
explain why the superselection rule—no macroscopic superposition—obtains.
However, at this point, attention focusses back on what exactly is meant by
‘macroscopic’, and by ‘macroscopically distinct’. Different ways in which one
seeks to implement the collapse mechanism in one’s collapse theory will lead to
different stories about exactly which kinds of superposition are killed-off. Thus
in many ways, Leggett and Garg’s ‘macroscopic realism’, as stated, fails to
pick-out a natural kind of theories. Which basis (or approximate basis) will one
achieve collapse to? Equivalently: with respect to which basis is superposition
forbidden (at least on suitable timescales)? These questions can’t be answered
unless one is presented with the detailed proposed theory.
By way of illustration, consider what the GRW theory would say about
Leggett and Garg’s favoured example of the distinct macroscopic current states
in a SQUID. As was shown by Rae (1990), even though GRW will quickly entail
collapse to determinate states for macroscopic pointer variables of a measuring
apparatus (spatially distinct states), it will not entail collapse to one or other of
the distinct |+1〉 or |−1〉 current states of the SQUID. This is because the GRW
theory works by spontaneous spatial localisation occuring to microsystems, but
since the two distinct current states of the SQUID wholly overlap spatially,
the localisation process makes almost no difference to either of these states,
and certainly doesn’t distinguish between them. At best, the effect of GRW
localisations will occasionally be to split-up a Cooper pair, and thus increase
somewhat the normal dissipativeness of the superconductor; but it will not effect
collapse. Thus GRW is a macropscopic realist theory which readily allows that
the Leggett-Garg inequality could be violated for measurements on SQUIDs. In
general, we will be unable to tell whether a given realist collapse theory will or
will not require satisfaction of a Leggett-Garg inequality in a given experimental
set-up unless we are told the details of the collapse process. It would seem that
if a Leggett-Garg experiment is performed and violation of the inequality is
shown, it could still be that a macroscopic realist theory in Leggett and Garg’s
original sense is the true theory of nature, it is just one which does not impose
collapse in the particular basis (or approximate basis) which has been deployed
in the experiment. We conclude that so far, Leggett and Garg’s macroscopic
realism has not, unlike Bell’s local causality, picked out a particularly natural
class of theories which may be tested directly against experiment.
4 An operational formulation of the question
So far we have seen i) that denial of the possibility of macroscopic superposition
cannot be the correct way, as it stands, of formulating macroscopic realism;
ii) that there can be realist understandings of quantum theory which account
for the determinate nature of the macroscopic world which surrounds us and,
consequently, which account for the determinate nature of our experience, yet
which readily admit (indeed, embrace) macroscopic superposition; and iii) that
even having broadened the notion of macroscopic realism away simply from
‘no macroscopic superposition’, one can achieve realism about the macroscopic
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without having to be a macroscopic realist even in this broader sense. Moreover,
we have seen that the question of whether or not macroscopic realism really does
forbid violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality is unclear in general; and even
in the relatively narrow case of the family of realist collapse theories, whether
or not satisfaction of the inequality should hold for a given experimental set-up
will depend on the details of the collapse mechanism, which (in principle at
least) could vary really quite widely. It is time to go back to the drawing board.
Let us introduce a fairly familiar kind of operational formalism (cf. Spekkens
(2005)) as a means of framing the general questions surrounding macroscopic
realism and the Leggett-Garg inequality. Thus we will consider dividing-up any
given experimental arrangement in the lab into three components, a preparation
process, E, a transformation process, T , and a measurement process,M , having
distinct outcomes taking values Q = qi. We consider these three different com-
ponents, from the point of view of the formalism, simply as black-boxes, with
no assumption as to their internal workings. These different elements are to be
identified operationally, and in the formalism, the experimental arrangement as
a whole is characterised by a probability distribution P(E,T,M)(Q = qi), being
the probabilities that, given the preparation E, followed by the transformation
T , the measurement M will have such-and-such outcomes. These probabilities
are assumed to be measurable from the long-run statistics displayed by the ex-
perimental apparatus. Occasionally, for brevity, and where it will not lead to
confusion, we may suppress certain indices. Note also that it is somewhat arbi-
trary how one divides a given experimental arrangement up—one might include
a transformation as part of a preparation, for example, rather than treating it
as a separate process; equally, one might include a transformation as part of the
measurement procedure; or again, one might include a measurement’s having
had a certain outcome as part of a preparation process, perhaps.
Preparations, transformations and measurements will naturally divide-up
into equivalence classes. (Indeed, this is important in the very notion of sepa-
rating out an experimental arrangement into three general kinds of process.)
1. Two different preparation procedures E1 and E2 will be operationally
equivalent (E1 ≃ E2) iff for any transformation, and for any measure-
ment, the same probability distribution over outcomes obtains whichever
preparation procedure was performed:
E1 ≃ E2 ↔ ∀qi, T,M P(E1,T,M)(Q = qi) = P(E2,T,M)(Q = qi).
2. Two different transformation procedures T1 and T2 are operationally equiv-
alent (T1 ≃ T2) iff for any preparation and for any measurement, it makes
no difference to the probabilities for measurement outcomes which trans-
formation took place:
T1 ≃ T2 ↔ ∀qi, E,M P(E,T1,M)(Q = qi) = P(E,T2,M)(Q = qi).
3. Two different measurement procedures M1 and M2 will be operationally
equivalent (M1 ≃ M2) iff their respective sets of outcomes Q1 = qi
and Q2 = qj can be put into one-to-one correspondence, and whatever
the preparation beforehand and whatever the transformation beforehand,
there would be agreement on the probabilities assigned to outcomes for
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these measurements:
M1 ≃M2 ↔ ∀qi, E, T P(E,T,M1)(Q1 = qi) = P(E,T,M2)(Q2 = qi).
In this framework, an equivalence class of measurements naturally corre-
sponds to some physical quantity or other.10
Now let us go back to consider the following experimental set-up, familiar
from our previous discussion. At time t0, a fixed preparation process E is
performed on system S. At time t1 > t0, a measurementM1 having two possible
outcomes Q1 = ±1 is performed on S. At time t2 > t1, a measurement M2,
having two possible outcomes Q2 = ±1 is performed on S. And finally, at
time t3 > t2, a measurement M3, having two possible outcomes Q3 = ±1 is
performed on S. Between t1 and t2, S is subject to the time evolution T1; and
between t2 and t3, S is subject to the time evolution T2.
This whole arrangement is described by the joint probability distribution:
P(E,M1,T1,M2,T2,M3)(Q1 = qi, Q2 = qj , Q3 = qk). (5)
Notice that at this stage we have made no assumption that the measurements
M1,M2 and M3 all belong to the same equivalence class, i.e., intuitively, that
they are all measurements (perhaps in different ways) of one and the same
physical quantity.
When a well-defined joint probability distribution exists, then we can of
course derive the probability distribution for a smaller number of the same set
of variables, simply by summing-out the remaining variables (i.e., by taking the
marginal distribution). For example, if we just wanted to know the probabili-
ties for the outcomes of the first measurement, we could derive it from (5) as
follows (suppressing the indices for the initial preparation and the intermediate
transformations, for brevity):
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1 = qi) =
∑
qjqk
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1 = qi, Q2 = qj , Q3 = qk).
Similarly, if we were interested in the correlations between the outcomes of the
first and second measurement in this set-up, we could calculate them from (5)
as follows:
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1 = qi, Q2 = qj) =
∑
qk
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1 = qi, Q2 = qj , Q3 = qk);
and so on for other pairs of variables of interest. Expectation values for the
outcomes of the measurements are then simply given by weighting the value of
the outcomes by their probability, so, for example:
〈Q1Q2〉M1M2M3 =
∑
qiqj
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1 = qi, Q2 = qj)qiqj ; (6)
and so on.
10Indeed, formally, though not metaphysically, one would want to identify a physical quan-
tity with an equivalence class of measurement procedures, in this kind of framework.
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Now return to reflect again on Table 1, and the quantity QLG = Q1Q2 +
Q1Q3 + Q2Q3. As noted before, when a joint probability distribution for the
trio of variables Q1, Q2, Q3 exists, as it does given (5), then evidently
−1 ≤ 〈QLG〉M1M2M3 ≤ 3.
(Again, notice that here we have not, as we assumed before, requiredM1,M2 and
M3 all to be measurements of the same quantity, i.e., be in the same equivalence
class. We are considering them all to be performed, however.)
As before, we will now seek to compare the behaviour of the experimental
set-up where one performs all three of the measurements with the behaviour
of the trio of distinct sub-experiments in each of which only two of the stated
measurements are performed (though the preparation E and transformations T1
and T2 remain the same in all three sub-experiments). Of course, in a general
operational probabilistic theory in which a joint probability distribution like
(5) is defined, we can infer nothing about the joint probabilities for the pairs
of values when only two experiments are performed. Since we are considering
quite distinct experimental arrangements, the joint probabilities for the pairs
of values in experiments in which only two measurements are performed are
not constrained by the joint distribution for the triples of values when all three
measurements are performed. Given that these are distinct experimental ar-
rangements, the former quantities are not to be derived by taking the marginal
distributions of the latter.
However, if the following highly non-trivial conditions on the probabilities
obtain (again, supressing the indices for the preparation and the transforma-
tions), then the Leggett-Garg inequality as in (4) will follow (though here for
the slightly more general case of possibly differing binary measurements M1,
M2 and M3):
P(M1,M2)(Q1=qi, Q2=qj) =
∑
qk
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=qi, Q2=qj, Q3=qk) (7)
P(M2,M3)(Q2=qj, Q3=qk) =
∑
qi
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=qi, Q2=qj, Q3=qk) (8)
P(M1,M3)(Q1=qi, Q3=qk) =
∑
qj
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=qi, Q2=qj, Q3=qk). (9)
It is crucial to notice that, unlike in the standard Leggett-Garg proof, as above,
we have here assumed nothing about the existence or otherwise of definite pos-
sessed values of physical quantities prior to measurement. We are working
directly with the probabilities alone, which are themselves directly measurable
by experiment.
4.1 Operational non-disturbance implies the Leggett-Garg
Inequality
What do the conditions (7–9) above amount to? They relate the joint probabili-
ties for the case where only pairs of measurements are performed to the marginal
probabilities for pairs of variables in the case where all three measurements are
performed.
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The first condition, (7), is a very natural, and perhaps obligatory, constraint
to do with time order: it says that whether or not one performs a measurement
later-on should not affect the probability distribution over the outcomes of pre-
viously performed measurements. It is a requirement of no signalling backwards
in time, so it can be assumed fairly uncontroversially.
The second two conditions, (8) and (9), are stronger than the time-ordering
requirement. They are conditions that one’s measurements M1 and M2 are
respectively, in a sense to be made more precise in a moment, operationally
non-disturbing. That is (roughly) it doesn’t make any difference to your other
statistics whether or not you perform the measurements. This is clearly a very
significant assumption to make.
Consider a preparation process E, followed by a measurement M , followed
by a further measurement M ′. As we shall define it, the measurement M is
operationally non-disturbing for the preparation E and subsequent measurement
M ′ iff it is not possible to tell, based upon the observed statistics of E and M ′
whether or not M was performed. This will hold iff :
P(E,M ′)(Q
′ = qj) =
∑
qi
P(E,M,M ′)(Q = qi, Q
′ = qj). (10)
The case where you do not perform the intermediate measurement is statistically
the same as the case in which the intermediate measurement does happen, but
you do not observe the outcome.
One can then define stronger notions as follows: M might be operationally
non-disturbing, given a prior preparation E, for any subsequent measurement
M ′; M might be operationally non-disturbing for a fixed subsequent measure-
ment M ′ for any prior preparation E. Most strongly of all, M might be opera-
tionally non-disturbing for any preparation E and any subsequent measurement
M ′; in which case it will be said to be operationally non-disturbing tout court.
This is evidently a very strong constraint indeed.
Notice that it is important in the definition we have given of operational
non-disturbance that E might be composed of a sequence of previous processes,
including previous measurements, and thatM ′ might be composed of a sequence
of subsequent processes, including future measurements. Thus there may be a
whole sequence of prior and of posterior measurement statistics with respect to
which one is assessing whether the presence or absence ofM makes a difference.
With these possibilities noted, we can now use the notion of operational non-
disturbance to clarify the content of our previous conditions (8) and (9).
Condition (8) states thatM1 is operationally non-disturbing given the prepa-
ration E (index suppressed in the previous sub-section) and the subsequent
measurements of M2 followed by M3. Condition (9) states that M2 is opera-
tionally non-disturbing for the subsequent measurement of M3, given the prior
preparation process which is constituted by the concatenation of E followed by
M1’s being performed and having a definite outcome.
Given the unexceptionable time-ordering condition (7), then, a Leggett-Garg
inequality immediately follows if the measurements M1 and M2 are suitably
operationally non-disturbing. Violation of the inequality, therefore, shows that
one or other, or both, of these measurements must in fact be operationally
disturbing. We note that we have had to say nothing here of macroscopic
realism, pre-possessed values, or null-result measurements. The logical relation
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between operational non-disturbance and the Leggett-Garg inequality is simple
and direct. Violation of the inequality means that at least one of the first two
measurements was operationally disturbing.11 The crucial question, to which we
shall return in due course, is whether or not there is anything about macroscopic
realism which suggests that operational non-disturbance should hold for the
pertinent measurements.
5 Operational non-disturbance vs. Ontic non-
invasiveness: The Ontic Models framework
With the condition of operational non-disturbance we have a very simple char-
acterisation of a condition which is sufficent to entail that a Leggett-Garg in-
equality should be satisfied. Importantly, it is possible to establish directly by
experiment whether or not a measurement M is operationally non-disturbing
for a given preparation and subsequent measurement, simply by comparing the
statistics in the case in which M is performed with those in the case in which
it is not.
How does the notion of operational non-disturbance relate to Leggett and
Garg’s notion of noninvasive measurability which, recall, was crucial to the way
that Leggett and Garg derive their inequality (as explained in Section 2)? It
transpires that two distinct ways of making precise the notion of noninvasive
measurability offer themselves. According to the first, noninvasive measurability
simply equates to operational non-disturbance. According to the second, it
amounts to a very much stronger condition. Both approaches seem to figure in
some measure in Leggett and Garg’s thought. In order to distinguish the two,
we shall need to introduce some further formal apparatus which will provide the
context for our discussion in the rest of the paper.
5.1 The ontic models framework
The framework we wish to introduce is due to Spekkens (2005) and is known as
the ontological models or ontic models framework. (See also Harrigan and Spekkens
(2010) and Leifer and Spekkens (2004).) It bears strong affinities to some ways
in which hidden variable theories are often discussed, but it is somewhat more
general and is usefully flexible.12
The idea is to supplement an operational probabilistic theory of the kind
introduced above with some account of what gives rise to the observed probabil-
ities. Thus a system has associated with it an ontic state, denoted λ, belonging
to a space of states, Λ, for the system, where this ontic state captures the real
physical properties of the system: properties which the system actually pos-
sesses independently of observation or measurement. For example, in n-body
classical particle mechanics, the ontic state of the system would be the position
in phase space; in views of quantum theory which are realist about the quantum
state, the quantum state itself would be the ontic state, or part of it.
11The converse doesn’t hold in general. See Appendix for details.
12It is somewhat more general, for example, as the framework naturally incorporates versions
of quantum theory which are wavefunction realist, but not usually thought of as hidden
variable theories.
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The framework also associates with a system a probability distribution µ(λ)
over the system’s set of ontic states Λ. Thus, in particular, a given preparation
process E (in the operational sense above) for a given system will produce a
certain probability distribution µE(λ) over the system’s set of possible ontic
states (
∫
λ
µE(λ)dλ = 1). If the preparation is very precise, this probability
distribution may be a delta function—i.e., one has managed to ensure that the
system is definitely in one and only one of its possible ontic states. But it
may very well be that no such maximally fine preparations are possible, and
that the best one can do is to produce a spread of possible ontic states, with
some probability distribution over them. It will be convenient for later-on to
introduce the notation
supp(µi) := {λ|µi(λ) > 0}
for the support of the probability distribution µi(λ), i.e., for the set of states λ ∈
Λ for which the probability distribution µi(λ) is non-zero. A mixture (convex
combination) of preparationsEi will give us another preparation:
∑
iwiµEi(λ) =
µ(λ), for wi ≥ 1,
∑
iwi = 1.
Here are some familiar examples to illustrate the idea: 1. In classical sta-
tistical mechanics with the microcanonical distribution, we have a probability
distribution µ(λ) over the ontic states of the system—our system is really lying
somewhere on the fixed energy hypersurface, but we don’t know where, and each
possibility gets equal probability. 2. In realist quantum theory with collapse,
our system is always really in some pure state, but it may well be that we don’t
know which (e.g. following a non-selective measurement process); the system is
said to be in a proper mixture and we assign a probability distribution over the
options.
Let us now consider measurement processes. Measuring devices M respond
in some way to the system’s being in the ontic state λ at the time of measure-
ment. This is characterised by the response function ξM (Q = q|λ), being the
probability that the measuring device M will indicate the outcome value Q = q
given that the system is in ontic state λ on measurement. In general Q might
take on continuous values; for our present purposes we need only consider dis-
crete values qi. The response of the measuring device to a particular λ might
be deterministic, in which case the range of the response function would be
{0, 1}, or—more generally—the response might be stochastic, in which case the
range of the response function would lie in the full interval [0, 1]. Evidently,∑
qi
ξM (Q = qi|λ) = 1. Notice that even if two measurementsM andM ′ belong
to the same operational equivalence class (M ≃M ′) they may well not respond
in the same way to a given ontic state λ, i.e., they may have different response
functions. In this case, we have contextuality, a dependence on the way in which
a given quantity is measured. (Spekkens (2005) calls this form of contextuality
measurement contextuality.)
Transformation processes T are represented by stochastic maps from ontic
states to ontic states: τT (λ|λ0), giving the probability distribution over subse-
quent ontic states given that one started in the earlier ontic state λ0. Note that
a preparation followed by a transformation gives us another preparation:
µ(E,T )(λ) =
∫
dλ0µE(λ0)τT (λ|λ0).
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Putting all of preparation, transformation and measurement together, we
now have:
P(E,T,M)(Q = qi) =
∫
dλ0dλ1µE(λ0)τT (λ1|λ0)ξM (Q = qi|λ1).
We also wish explicitly to note the effect that performing a measurement, and
its having had a particular outcome, may have on the underlying ontic state.
We formalise this using a particular transformation map which we associate
with the measurement M : τM (λ|Q = qi, λ0). In other words, the probability
distribution over ontic states post-measurement may depend on the particular
measurement M performed, on the particular outcome Q = qi that occurred,
and on what the pre-measurement ontic state λ0 was. Once more, even if two
measurements belong to the same operational equivalence class, it may well be
that they do not affect the ontic states of the system in the same way.
As we have said, realist collapse interpretations of quantum theory can be
described in the ontic models framework; seeing this will help illustrate how
the framework functions. In this case the ontic states λ are the pure states
|ψ〉 ∈ H, where H is the Hilbert space of the system. If one has a pure-
state preparation procedure preparing the system in the state |φ〉, then the
probability distribution over ontic states generated by the preparation is simply
µ|φ〉(λ) = δ|φ〉,|ψ〉. A mixed-state preparation is just a convex sum of these. The
measurement response functions are as follows, for the simple case of projective
measurement. For a measurement M which is associated with a particular
orthonormal basis {|qi〉} of H, we have ξM (Q = qi|λ0 = |φ〉) = |〈qi|φ〉|2. If M
is a projective measurement ‘of the first kind’ then τM (λ = |ψ〉|Q = qi, λ0 =
|φ〉) = δ|ψ〉,|qi〉, i.e., the measurement doesn’t affect the system if it is already in
an eigenstate of the quantity measured, and it leaves it in an eigenstate of the
quantity measured otherwise.
A further illustration, which will be useful later-on, is given by the de
Broglie–Bohm theory. Here the ontic state of a system is not given by the
quantum state |ψ〉 alone, but by the ordered pair of quantum state and position
in configuration space: λ ∈ {(|ψ〉, X)}.Now for a pure-state preparation process,
the resultant probability distribution is
µ|φ〉(λ) = δ|φ〉,|ψ〉|〈φ|X |φ〉|2.
That is, even for the most refined preparation process one can achieve in the
theory, there is still a non-trivial (in fact, Born rule) probability distribution over
the ontic states. The measurement response functions in the de Broglie–Bohm
theory are all deterministic, ξM (Q = qi|λ) ∈ {0, 1}, but, importantly, they are
contextual ; the value assigned to the outcome of the measurement depends on
which particular measurement process it is, not just on the equivalence class
that the measurement belongs to.
With the ontic models framework now in hand, let us return to analysing
the two distinct notions of noninvasive measurability.
5.2 Noninvasiveness as operational non-disturbance
One quite natural way of reading Leggett and Garg’s (1985) characterisation of
noninvasive measurability at the macroscopic level (A2) is as follows. We are
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certainly used to thinking of the large-scale macroscopic objects we encounter
in our daily lives as being composed of very large numbers of microsystems, the
vast majority of whose detailed features make no difference at all to the coarse-
grained properties and behaviour of these macroscopic objects which surround
us. In a thermodynamic kind of way, the microscopic details wash-out: there
are large numbers of different microstates a given object could be in, but exactly
which it is in makes no difference at all to the object’s large-scale macroscopic
features. The space of microstates naturally partitions into distinct sets of mi-
crostates, where the same macroscopically observable features obtain whichever
of the microstates from a given such set the system happens to be in.
Noninvasive measurability at the macroscopic level might then seem intu-
itively plausible, since one might suppose that—for all that one may very well
disturb the microstate of the system when one observes it (exchange of mo-
mentum from photons bouncing off, or what have you)—one typically does not
change themacroscopic features one is measuring, one only moves the microstate
around inside the set of macroscopically-equivalent microstates. It might then
also seem plausible to assume that the microscopic change one has induced will
not affect transition probabilities between macroscopic states of the system in
the future. In this case, noninvasive measurability is essentially a statistical
notion and is an instance of our notion of operational non-disturbance.
To help formalise this, let us introduce the notion of an operational eigen-
state. Take an equivalence class of measurements M˜ = {M ′|M ′ ≃ M}, and
call the corresponding physical quantity, which each M ′ ∈ M˜ can be thought
of as measuring, Q˜. We define an operational eigenstate of Q˜ to be a particular
equivalence class of preparation processes. A preparation E is in such an equiv-
alence class iff, following E, any measurement M ′ ∈ M˜ would give the same
{0, 1} probability distribution over the outcomes Q′ = qi of the measurement.
That is, if one’s system has been prepared in the qi operational eigenstate of Q˜
then any measurement M ′ ∈ M˜ will return the value qi with probability 1 (and
conversely). Now, we know from experience that when the macroscopic prop-
erties of a system are actually being observed, the preparation state which the
system is thereby put into will be an operational eigenstate of those properties.
In other words, having looked at some macroscopic object and seen that it has
some particular value for its macroscopic properties, if we look again immedi-
ately afterwards (or at any rate, if we look again soon enough afterwards), we
will find those properties to have the same values. Operational eigenstates for
macroscopic quantities Q˜, therefore, can be used to characterise the behaviour
of macroscopic systems while they are being observed.
Measurement of some macroscopic quantity can be performed noninvasively,
in the sense articulated above, if there is some measurement M in the opera-
tional equivalence class corresponding to the macroscopic quantity in question
which is operationally non-disturbing when the system begins in an operational
eigenstate of the macroscopic quantity, and given a subsequent measurement of
that quantity.
Leggett (1995) seems to have had this statistical notion of noninvasive mea-
surability (an instance of our notion of operational non-disturbance) in mind
when he phrased the condition as follows:
“(P3) (‘noninvasive measurability’): it is in principle possible to
measure the value Q(t) on an ensemble without altering the sta-
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tistical properties of that ensemble as regards subsequent measure-
ments.” (Leggett, 1995, p.104, emphasis added.)
This formulation would seem to allow that there could be an effect on micro-
scopic features when we are considering a macroscopic system, but that the
observable statistics should not change.
Two things to note. First, the requirement of noninvasive measurability, un-
derstood in the way we have been suggesting, does not require that every way
of measuring a quantity Q˜ be operationally non-disturbing, but only that there
be some measurement M of Q˜ which is. Second, whilst we have said there is
some intuitive plausibility in the story about the possibility of noninvasive mea-
surability and its connection to the notion of the macroscopic (one might make
changes at the microscopic level, but these may not affect things at the macro-
scopic level) this cannot be taken too far. Perhaps in certain circumstances
one hasn’t noticed anything suggesting that one’s observations of macroscopic
objects have changed them, or most especially, changed their future behaviour,
but very rarely has one actually checked in any detail to see.
5.3 Noninvasiveness as ontic noninvasiveness
The second way of understanding noninvasive measurability is as a much stronger
condition, what we shall call ontic noninvasiveness. A measurement M is onti-
cally noninvasive if it does not change at all the ontic state of the system that
obtained prior to measurement, whatever that state might have been. M will
be ontically non-invasive for a given outcome Q = qi iff the transformation τM
associated with the process of measurement is as follows:
τM (λ|Q = qi, λ0) = δλ,λ0 .
If M is ontically noninvasive for any outcome value qi, then it is ontically non-
invasive tout court.
Ontic noninvasiveness is a very strong condition on a measurement process.
It is evidently enough to entail operational non-disturbance, and thence the
Leggett-Garg inequality, as follows. If M is ontically noninvasive then for any
preparation E and for any subsequent measurementM ′, there will be no differ-
ence to the statistics forM ′ whether or notM was performed, that is,M ’s being
ontically noninvasive entails complete operational non-disturbance for M (i.e.
operational non-disturbance tout court). Therefore M will satisfy the weaker
operational non-disturbance conditions (8–9) above (we consider performing
the same type of measurement M at the two different times t1 and t2), and
the Leggett-Garg inequality will follow. But the converse implication doesn’t
hold. The two weaker operational non-disturbance conditions (8–9) certainly
do not entail that M is ontically noninvasive, and even M ’s being completely
operationally non-disturbing does not entail that M is ontically non-invasive,
unless it is always possible to prepare arbitrary (and in particular, arbitrarily
sharp) probability distributions over one’s ontic states, and this will certainly
not hold in general in theories. Therefore, a measurement M ’s being opera-
tionally non-disturbing is clearly a significantly logically weaker notion than its
being ontically noninvasive.
Now suppose that the measurementM has only two possible outcomes, and
that it is only ontically noninvasive for one of these, say Q = +1 (the argu-
ment extends in the obvious way for the more general case of a larger number
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of outcomes). If there is another measurement, M ′, in the same operational
equivalence class asM , which also happens to be ontically noninvasive, but this
time only for Q = −1, then these two measurement processes, along with a post-
selection procedure, can be combined to produce a scenario in which the total
effect is that of complete ontic noninvasiveness. The procedure is simple. On
an ensemble of identically prepared systems, half the time one should perform
M and half the time one should perform M ′. If the outcome of M was +1 one
keeps the result, and knows that the ontic state of the system on that run of the
experiment was not affected by the measurement; if the outcome of M ′ was -1
one keeps the result, and again knows that the ontic state of the system on that
run of the experiment was not affected. In all other cases, the data is discarded.
The effect of this post-selection procedure is to select-out a sub-ensemble of the
total ensemble where the ontic state of each of the members of the ensemble is
guaranteed not to have been affected by the process of measurement. Since M
and M ′ belong to the same operational equivalence class, they can of course be
thought of as both measuring the same physical quantity.
Leggett and Garg’s central, explicit, argument that noninvasive measurabil-
ity should hold in the case of macroscopic realism proceeds, recall, by invoking
the notion of null-result measurements. The idea is to post-select just those
results where no result of the measurement was observed, so where it is believed
that nothing happened, so a fortiori it is believed that nothing happened to the
ontic state of the system on that run, on the assumption that the system must
have one or other definite value of the quantity being measured before measure-
ment. In the manner just described, by combining a suitable pair of null-result
measurements and post-selecting, the result will be that the ontic states of the
systems in one’s ensemble, under these assumptions, will not have been affected
by the measurement, thus it will be the case that complete ontic noninvasiveness
holds for the process as a whole, when one includes post-selection.
The structure of Leggett and Garg’s argument from null result measurements
shows clearly that they certainly have ontic noninvasiveness in mind as the
relevant notion of noninvasiveness, at least at certain crucial junctures of their
thought.
5.4 Summary
To summarise some of our conclusions from the last two Sections, then:
1. The specific operational non-disturbance conditions for M1 and M2, that
M1 is operationally non-disturbing for the preparation/measurement pair
(E, (M2,M3)), and thatM2 is operationally non-disturbing for the prepa-
ration/measurement pair ((E,M1),M3), suffice (given time-order) to en-
tail the Leggett-Garg inequality:
OPNDspecific −→ LGI.
N.B. the converse does not hold: satisfying the inequality is not sufficient
to show that the measurements are operationally non-disturbing.
2. Complete operational non-disturbance for the measurements M1, M2, en-
tails specific operational non-disturbance (but not conversely), so:
OPNDcomplete −→ OPNDspecific −→ LGI.
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3. Ontic noninvasiveness entails complete operational non-disturbance, but
not conversely. Measurements which are only ontically noninvasive for
one measurement outcome can be combined with post-selection to achieve
complete ontic noninvasiveness.
ONI −→ OPNDcomplete −→ OPNDspecific −→ LGI.
It is clear therefore that what Leggett-Garg inequality violation most immedi-
ately shows is that one or other, or both, of M1 and M2 were operationally
disturbing for their respective preparations and measurements. These are the
weakest conditions that suffice to entail that the inequality should hold. One
would need specific reason to believe that one of the stronger conditions in fact
held in nature in order for there to be a reason to appeal to (potential) Leggett-
Garg inequality violation to rule it out. Notice once more that in none of the
chains of inference listed above have we had to invoke macroscopic realism to
arrive at the inequality. If we take Leggett and Garg’s notion of noninvasive-
ness simply to be (specific) operational non-disturbance (as we have seen there
is some reason to), then the inequality follows directly from that premise alone,
without requiring that macroscopic realism holds. Leggett and Garg suggest
that macroscopic realism combined with the existence of null result measure-
ments allows us to infer that the very strong condition of ontic noninvasiveness
holds. In that case, violation of the inequality would disprove the conjunction
of macroscopic realism and the existence of suitable null result measurements.
We defer assessing this argument until after we have a workable statement of
macroscopic realism on the table.
6 What is macrorealism? Second pass
We saw in Section 3 that Leggett and Garg’s notion of macroscopic realism did
not seem to be capturing any particular natural class of theories which might
be considered to instantiate forms of macroscopic realism. Leggett and Garg’s
suggestion seems to be based upon the idea of a superselection rule, preventing
linear superpositions of macroscopically distinct quantum states. Unfortunately
this suggestion is far too tied to the quantum formalism to make an appropriate
model independent criterion in itself. We will now try and refine the notion in
a suitably model independent form.
We approach this through Leggett’s comment that “what is relevant is
that the different final states of the apparatus are macroscopically distinguish-
able”(Leggett, 1988, p.943). If two states are macroscopically distinguishable,
there must be a macroscopically observable difference between them. A macro-
scopic realist, then, would believe that these macroscopically observable prop-
erties always have determinate values, at all times.
Macroscopically observable properties correspond in the formalism to the
outcomes of macroscopic observations: the chair is in such and such a place, the
car is some particular colour. This suggests rephrasing macroscopic realism as:
A macroscopically observable property with two or more distinguish-
able values available to it will at all times determinately possess one
or other of those values.
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The state of the world is captured by the ontic state λ. If M is the macro-
scopic observation of a given property, Q˜, macroscopic realism requires that the
response function ξM (Q˜ = qi|λ) ∈ {0, 1} for all possible ontic states.
This must hold for all such measurements, and these measurements must
all agree on the value of the macroscopic property: so the physical location of
the chair does not depend upon how we look at it. For any two operationally
equivalent macroscopic observations, M ≃ M ′, any given ontic state must give
the same response: ∀λ ξM (Q˜ = qi|λ) = ξM ′ (Q˜ = qi|λ).
However, the conjunction of these two criteria is well known in quantum the-
ory, as it means that Q˜ = qi is non-contextually value definite. This might raise
a concern that macroscopic realism is already ruled out by the Kochen-Specker
theorem(Kochen and Specker, 1967), which forbids any non-contextually value
definite formulation of quantum theory. Fortunately for the macroscopic realist,
the Kochen-Specker theorem only entails that some properties are contextual13.
The macroscopic realist need not be committed to the idea that all the properties
of a system are determinate, only that the macroscopically observable ones are.
To avoid confusion, we will use the term ‘macrodefinite’ for ‘non-contextually
value definite for all macroscopically observable properties’.
We have not attempted here to characterise what, exactly, are the macro-
scopically observable properties, though they may be expected to be a very
coarse-grained mutually commuting subset of the quantum observables.
Finally, we may now go on to characterise two ontic states as macroscopically
distinct if, and only if, there is at least one macroscopically observable property
to which the two states have a zero probability of assigning the same value.
With this definition, macroscopic realism expressed about observable properties
recovers macroscopic realism expressed about states.
7 What does Leggett-Garg Inequality violation
in fact rule out?
The arguments surrounding macroscopic realism and the Leggett–Garg inequal-
ity can be boiled down into consideration of the following simplified case. The
macroscopic realist regarding a macroscopic quantity Q˜ believes that all ontic
states λ are non-contextually value-definite for Q˜ (are macrodefinite for Q˜).
Now consider a simple experimental sequence of: preparation—measurement of
Q˜—measurement of Q˜, i.e., an (E,M1,M2) sequence, where M1 ≃ M2 ∈ M˜ ,
M˜ being the operational equivalence class of measurements which corresponds
to the quantity Q˜. (N.B. we of course allow time evolution between E and M1
and between M1 and M2.)
Suppose our macroscopic realist has carefully tested the features of an M1
measurement and has established conclusively by experiment that for any op-
erational eigenstate preparations of Q˜, M1 is operationally non-disturbing, for
any subsequent measurement M2 ∈ M˜ . This amounts to saying that, whenever
Q˜ is prepared with a definite value, M1 will not disturb the statistics for later
measurements of Q˜. Evidently, if a measurement is operationally non-disturbing
for a given set of preparations, it will also be non-disturbing for convex combina-
tions of those preparations; so M1 is operationally non-disturbing for statistical
13Though it does entail that this must be the case for every possible ontic state.
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mixtures of operational eigenstates of Q˜ too.
Now suppose that we perform the experiment (E,M1,M2) many times, and
compare the resultant statistics with those for the sequence (E,M2). (The time
evolutions, other than at measurements, are kept the same in the two cases.)
Since the macroscopic realist already believes that M1 is operationally non-
disturbing whenever Q˜ is prepared as having either one value or the other, and
since the macroscopic realist believes that Q˜ must always take on one value or
the other, they will be very surprised indeed if our experiments now reveal that
M1 was in fact disturbing—that the statistics for the two sets of experiments
differ after all. How could this be, given that we have already checked that the
measurement will not be disturbing when we’ve prepared a definite value for
Q˜? Must we conclude that it cannot in fact be the case that Q˜ always takes
on a definite value, i.e., must we conclude that macroscopic realism is false? If
there are ontic states which are not macrodefinite for Q˜ then this would explain
how it can be that the measurement was in fact disturbing, when we’d already
established that it would not be if the systems being measured were prepared as
having a definite value of Q˜. This is the core argument in the whole discussion
of macroscopic realism.14
Suggestive as it is, this argument is not valid as an argument against macro-
scopic realism, as we shall now see. Careful reflection shows that macroscopic
realism can come in a range of sub-varieties, and it is only one of these sub-
varieties which can be refuted in this way, by showing that one’s measurement
was after all operationally disturbing—for example, by means of showing that
the relevant Leggett–Garg inequality is violated. (Violation of operational non-
disturbance in this set-up is a necessary condition for violating the associated
Leggett–Garg inequality. See Appendix for details.)
7.1 Macrorealism 1: Operational Eigenstate Mixture Macro-
realism
The macroscopic realist (for a macroscopic property Q˜) believes that all ontic
states λ ∈ Λ are macrodefinite for Q˜. Although it is possible to prepare a macro-
scopic system in such a way that the preparation state is not macrodefinite, to
the macroscopic realist such a preparation does not mean anything more than
that there is an epistemic ignorance of which particular value has been realised
by an unknown ontic state.
When the macroscopic quantity is observed, the system is immediately af-
terwards in an operational eigenstate of the macroscopic quantity, with the
observed value. Given the existence of a measurement procedure, M1, that has
been verified to be operationally non-disturbing for any such operational eigen-
state, it is not unreasonable to suppose in the general case that the preparation
state prior to such a measurement was simply the statistical mixture of different
operational eigenstates, with different values for the macroscopic property. The
effect of the measurement would then just be to lift the epistemic ignorance
of the possessed value, and the post-measurement operational eigenstate would
result from a conditionalisation of the probability distribution on the observed
value. Absent any reason to suppose otherwise, this might be seen as the most
14IfM1 is (E, M˜)-operationally non-disturbing, then a Leggett–Garg inequality should hold
for this simplified arrangement. We clarify this formally in the Appendix below.
27
natural interpretation of the measurement process.
This leads to the following view:
The only possible preparation states of a system S are operational eigenstates
of Q˜ and statistical mixtures thereof.
Call this view operational eigenstate mixture macrorealism. It is clearly a very
natural way for a macroscopic realist to think, and it suggests that, whatever
may happen at the microscopic level, the macroscopic properties of an unob-
served system will continue to behave in the same way as they do when the
system is being observed.
Putting things a little more formally, a preparation Eqi belongs to the qi
operational eigenstate equivalence class E˜qi iff P(Eqi ,M)(Q = qi) = 1, for all
M ∈ M˜ . Call the probability distribution prepared by Eqi , µEqi (λ). Then for
all λ and for all M ∈ M˜ , λ ∈ supp(µE˜qi ) ↔ ξM (Q = qi|λ) = 1. Denote by
µqi(λ) an arbitrary mixture (convex sum) of operational eigenstate preparation
distributions µEqi(λ). Then according to the operational eigenstate macrore-
alist, every preparation state µ(λ) is given by a sum
∑
qi
wqiµqi(λ). Every
ontic state λ in the support of µqi is non-contextually value-definite, with value
Q = qi, and every µqi is preparable in the lab, as is every convex sum of such
distributions. On this view, the full ontic state space Λ is exhausted by the
union for all qi of the supports of the distributions µqi which arise from the
operational eigenstate preparations.
Perhaps the simplest example of operational eigenstate macrorealism is quan-
tum theory with a macroscopic superselection rule. In this case, the ontic states
would be identified with the (pure) quantum state itself, it’s just that super-
positions of macroscopically distinct states are not physically permitted. The
definition of operational eigenstate mixture macrorealism, therefore, naturally
incorporates the type of theory that Leggett and Garg seemed originally to have
had in mind.
Now, if operational eigenstate mixture macrorealism obtains, then if one
has checked that a measurement M1 is operationally non-disturbing for oper-
ational eigenstate preparations, it will be quite impossible for the statistics for
(E,M1,M2) to differ from those for (E,M2), i.e., for M1 to be operationally
disturbing in this configuration, and consequently for a Leggett-Garg inequality
to be violated, for the simple reason that there are no preparation states avail-
able which are not operational eigenstates or mixtures thereof. Thus should M1
prove to be operationally disturbing, either by a direct test, or by violation of
the associated Leggett–Garg inequality, we must reject operational eigenstate
mixture macrorealism.
7.2 Macrorealism 2: Operational Eigenstate Support
Macrorealism
Now consider a different view. Suppose it remains the case that every ontic state
is macrodefinite for Q˜—so the view is macroscopic realist—and suppose that it
remains the case that the full space Λ of ontic states is still given by the union
of the supports of the distributions which can be arrived at by taking convex
sums of operational eigenstate preparations, just as in operational eigenstate
28
mixture macrorealism. Thus no ontic states exist which cannot be accessed by
an operational eigenstate preparation (i.e., which do not fall into the support of
some µEqi(λ)). However, suppose that the set of possible probability distribu-
tions µ(λ) is larger than the set of convex combinations of operational eigenstate
preparation distributions, so that whilst we have the same ontic state space as
in operational eigenstate mixture macrorealism, the allowed distributions over
that space differ. Call this view operational eigenstate support macrorealism
(since all the ontic states are in the support of some operational eigenstate
preparation.)
Formally, if µqi(λ) is an arbitrary mixture of operational eigenstate prepa-
ration distributions µEqi (λ), as before, and µ(λ) is an arbitrary prepara-
tion of the system, the preparation-support macrorealist believes that µ(λ) =∑
qi
wqiνqi(λ), where νqi(λ) > 0 only if λ ∈ supp(µE˜qi ). Where the operational
eigenstate support macrorealist differs from the operational eigenstate mixture
macrorealist is that for the former, νqi(λ) cannot in general be expressed as a
convex sum of the operational eigenstate preparations µEqi (λ).
In such a theory it is quite clear how a Leggett-Garg inequality can be
violated/a measurement turn out surprisingly to be operationally disturbing,
while yet the theory remains fully macrorealist. One might have demonstrated
that a measurement M1 is operationally non-disturbing for every operational
eigenstate preparation that has been performed, without it being the case that
it is operationally non-disturbing for every preparation µ(λ) that might arise.
So for example, even if one starts with an operational eigenstate preparation
(or a convex combination of them)—for which one has indeed established that
M1 would be operationally non-disturbing—it could be that before M1 takes
place, µ(λ) has evolved away from this initial preparation, and it could well be
that the new distribution is disturbed by M1. This would be something that
we simply hadn’t checked for. The effect of M1 could still be ontically invasive:
it may shuffle the ontic states around, so that τM (λ|Q = qi, λ0) 6= δλ,λ0 , but in
such a way that the overall probability distribution does not change, whenever
that distribution is an operational eigenstate distribution:
µEqi (λ) =
∫
dλ0µEqi (λ0)τM (λ|Q = qi, λ0).
Operational eigenstates would function rather like equilibrium distributions.
However, once the distribution has evolved away from being a mixture of op-
erational eigenstate distributions, then the shifting around of the ontic states
which M1 induces is such as to disturb the distribution in a way which may be
observed:
νqi(λ) 6=
∫
dλ0νqi(λ0)τM (λ|Q = qi, λ0).
In operational eigenstate support macrorealism, what allows a Leggett-Garg
inequality to be violated is not the existence of ontic states which are not
macrodefinite for Q˜, but the existence of novel probability distributions over the
ontic states which are not given by mixtures of operational eigenstates. One’s
measurements of Q˜ might be operationally disturbing for the former, without
being operationally disturbing for the latter.
An example of a theory of this kind is given by the original Kochen-
Specker non-contextual hidden variable model for a two-state system
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(Kochen and Specker, 1967).15
7.3 Macrorealism 3: Supra Eigenstate Support Macrore-
alism
In the final variety of macroscopic realism, it of course once more remains the
case that all ontic states are macrodefinite for Q˜, but that here, in contrast to
both the operational eigenstate mixture and the operational eigenstate support
versions of macroscopic realism, there are novel macrodefinite ontic states λ
which do not fall into the support of any operational eigenstate preparation.
When one reliably prepares a system in a definite state of Q˜ (when, that is, one
prepares the system in an operational eigenstate) one is only accessing part of
the macrodefinite-for-Q˜ ontic state space. There are other states λ which are
still macrodefinite for Q˜ but which may only arise in preparations which have
non-zero probabilities for obtaining at least two possible outcomes Q = qi of a
measurement M ∈ M˜ : precisely when, in quantum mechanics, superpositions
would be prepared.
This view we can call supra eigenstate support macrorealism, as there
are macrodefinite ontic states which are not contained within the support of
any operational eigenstate preparation. Again, formally, although the supra
eigenstate support macrorealist believes that all preparations are of the form
µ(λ) =
∑
qi
wqiνqi(λ), where νqi(λ) > 0 → ξM (Q = qi|λ) = 1, the supra eigen-
state support macrorealist also believes there exist λ /∈ supp(µE˜qi ) for which
νqi(λ) > 0.
We saw earlier that the de Broglie–Bohm theory caused considerable trouble
for Leggett and Garg’s discussion of macroscopic realism and violation of the
Leggett-Garg inequality, since the de Broglie-Bohm theory certainly seemed, by
one perfectly good measure, to be macroscopic realist, but yet it allowed viola-
tion of the Leggett-Garg inequality just as ordinary quantum mechanics does.
The de Broglie–Bohm theory is precisely an example of supra eigenstate support
macrorealism, where the macrosopic quantity Q˜ is (possibly coarse-grained) po-
sition. Every ontic state λ = (|ψ〉, X) is non-contextually value-definite for posi-
tion, but when |ψ〉 = α|q〉+β|q′〉, the distribution µψ(λ) over ontic states again
cannot be given as a convex sum of the operational eigenstate distributions,
µq(λ) and µq′(λ), because novel—but still macrodefinite—ontic states are being
accessed. The Leggett-Garg inequality can readily be violated in the de Broglie–
Bohm theory, then, as, once more, when checking that our measurementM1 was
operationally non-disturbing for operational eigenstate preparations, we simply
have not checked that our measurement M1 is operationally non-disturbing for
all distributions over macrodefinite ontic states that there can be.16
15Granted: it is well known that such a model cannot be extended to higher dimensions,
when a sufficient number of distinct, non-compatible, observables are introduced. But this
does not entail that such models cannot work for a small enough set of observables. (Macro-
scopic realism is not the doctrine that one’s ontic states must be non-contextually value-
definite for all quantities.) Indeed, for macroscopic quantities, it is quite plausible that all
observable quantities should be compatible, so the issue is not, so far, especially troubling.
16Bacciagaluppi (2015) also discusses the case of the de Brogile–Bohm theory in the context
of Leggett-Garg violation.
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8 Macrorealism and null result measure-
ments: Macrorealism does not imply non-
invasiveness
Let us at long last come to consider in detail Leggett and Garg’s argu-
ments that macroscopic realism entails—or at least very strongly supports—
noninvasiveness, in the strong sense of ontic noninvasiveness. If this were so,
then Leggett-Garg inequality violation really would cause trouble for macro-
scopic realism per se, rather than merely for the specific form of operational
eigenstate mixture macrorealism. A significant part of our argument so far has
been that weaker conditions than macroscopic realism per se are sufficient on
their own to entail the Leggett-Garg inequality so that macroscopic realism
itself need not be impugned by violation of the inequality. Again, if Leggett
and Garg’s argument for ontic noninvasiveness works, then since ontic noninva-
siveness entails the weaker conditions, which entail the Leggett-Garg inequality,
macroscopic realism itself would be in danger, rather than (merely) the logically
weaker conditions.
The argument for ontic noninvasiveness as a corollary of macroscopic realism
goes as follows. Suppose we have available a pair of null-result measurements
for Q˜: we believe that M ′1 ∈ M˜ will interact with our system S iff S has a
definite value +1 (say) of Q˜, and we believe that M ′′2 ∈ M˜ will interact with
S iff S has a definite value −1 of Q˜. If macroscopic realism obtains (but not
otherwise), then when M ′1 does not fire, we may infer that the value of Q˜ was
−1, and that there can have been no affect on S, since there was no interaction.
Mutatis mutandis for when M ′′1 does not fire. Then by post-selection on cases
of no-firing, we can be assured of complete ontic noninvasiveness.
Let us tighten this argument up. In the framework we have adopted it is
not possible to formalise the notion of a null-result measurement directly, in
part for the very good reason that it is not at all a notion on which one may
get direct operational grip. That one might believe a measurement M ′1 only
to involve interaction with S in certain circumstances depends on what one’s
detailed model of the physical interaction is. Different physical models of the
interaction might disagree about whether that was the case.
Nevertheless, one might postulate as follows. Suppose we simply stipulate
that M ′1 ∈ M˜ is such that every λ which is non-contextually value-definite for
the -1 outcome is not affected by M ′1, and that M
′′
1 is such that every λ which
is non-contextually value-definite for the +1 outcome is not affected by M ′′1 .
If (and only if) every ontic state is macrodefinite for ±1, then following post-
selection on the -1 outcome forM ′1 and on the +1 outcome forM
′′
1 , we will have
a process which overall is guaranteed to be completely ontically noninvasive.
We do not talk of a ‘null-result’ here, as any measurement M ∈ M˜ is always
symbolised as having a result Q = ±1; however we can still call these measure-
ments the representations in our formalism of what Leggett and Garg have in
mind. So we have shown that in our formalism, with this characterisation of
null result measurements, macroscopic realism and the existence of null result
measurements likeM ′1 andM
′′
2 do indeed entail complete ontic noninvasiveness,
and thence on down the chain:
(MR and NRM)→ ONI→ OPNDcomplete → OPNDspecific → LGI.
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Of course, one immediate remark to make on this argument is that ontic
noninvasiveness does not follow from macroscopic realism alone, but only from
macroscopic realism with the additional stipulation of measurements which are
ontically noninvasive for given outcomes for certain of the macrodefinite ontic
states. And that there should exist such measurements is clearly no part at all of
the notion of macroscopic realism. The claim that all ontic states are macrodef-
inite does not require, in order for it to be sure of meaning, that some kinds of
measurements of the macroscopic quantity should be partially ontically nonin-
vasive (pace Leggett (1988, p. 949), Leggett (2002a, p.R449)).17 To be sure,
and for all its importance, we do not feel it likely that Leggett or Garg would be
much inclined to dispute this point. Rather, it seems to us, their main thought
is that given that one has a set of measurements in mind which would function
as null-result measurements, then it would be all but impossible to maintain
macroscopic realism if those measurements were to turn out to be operationally
disturbing. This is of a piece with the idea that one cannot hope to turn to just
any old set of measurements, even of macroscopic quantities, in order to set-up
an interesting test of the Leggett-Garg inequalities: one had better have some
good reason to believe in the first place that the macroscopic realist will think
that the measurements ought to be operationally non-disturbing, for to repeat,
their claim is not that every measurement need be noninvasive, whether in the
sense of operationally non-disturbing or in the sense of ontically noninvasive. If
one can find some measurements that the macroscopic realist might be inclined
to think should be noninvasive, then one’s Leggett-Garg test can begin to get
off the ground.
However, what remains as a point of fundamental importance is that there is
nothing model independent that can be appealed-to to establish whether or not
one should think of one’s measurements as being partially ontically non-invasive
in the way described above. If one happens to have certain views as to how the
detailed physics of the interaction between system and measuring apparatus
goes, then one might very well believe that one had a pair of measurements apt
for null-result, ontically non-invasive, measurement. But it could well be that
one’s model is wrong, rather than that it is macroscopic realism which is at fault.
Here we find a very fundamental difference with the case of the Bell inequali-
ties. That one’s theory should be locally causal followed in a model-independent
way from the setting of relativistic causal structure: spacelike separation auto-
matically motivated a certain kind of independence condition. Nothing of the
sort holds here—there is no general principle, or independent court of appeal,
which might suggest that one’s measurements should be partially ontically non-
invasive. This can only be a model-dependent hypothesis.
Leggett and Garg (1987) and Leggett (1988, p.950) suggest that it may be
possible to get an independent grip on the required property of ontic noninva-
siveness directly by experiment ‘at least up to a point’ (Leggett, 1988, p.950):
they consider (what is in our terminology) testing operational non-disturbance
for operational eigenstate preparations. It is certainly true that this is an essen-
tial move when beginning discussion of when a macroscopic realist should believe
a Leggett-Garg inequality should hold. Without first settling that the measure-
ments in question are operationally non-disturbing for operational eigenstates no
17This claim would only follow according to a curiously extreme positivist conception of
empirical meaning.
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macroscopic realist is compelled to believe that a Leggett-Garg inequality should
follow. But as we have seen, establishing such operational non-disturbance falls
enormously short of establishing anything like ontic noninvasiveness, and whilst
the operational eigenstate mixture macrorealist would be defeated if a subse-
quent test were then to show operational disturbance, we have seen that there
are two other respectable macroscopic realist positions which have no trouble
at all in incorporating operational disturbance for measurements which have
previously been shown to be operationally non-disturbing for operational eigen-
states.
In a telling passage, Leggett and Garg maintain:
“Should anyone wish to interpret the results of our proposed exper-
iment (assumed for present purposes to agree with QM) by saying
that the macroscopic object is indeed in a definite macroscopic state
but is nevertheless physically affected by an interaction which we
know could have occurred only if it had been in a different macro-
scopic state he or she is free to do so; we leave it to the reader to
judge whether such an interpretation in any way diminishes the force
of the quantum measurement paradox, or the significance of our pro-
posed experiment.” (Leggett and Garg, 1987, emphasis added.)
But the crucial point is: how would one know what one is supposed to know
here, if the point is to carry any force? How do we know that an interaction
could have occurred only if the system had been in the other state? (How
do we know that the measurement was ontically noninvasive for the outcome
recorded?) The answer is that we cannot, in a model independent manner. We
can only assume, and our assumption may well be wrong.
9 Conclusions
We have seen that macroscopic realism should be understood not as the claim
that certain kinds of quantum superposition are not possible, but as the claim
that all ontic states are non-contextually value-definite for a macroscopically
observable quantity Q˜. We have shown that macroscopic realism would not be
impugned by a Leggett-Garg inequality violation involving measurements of Q˜.
Within the notion of macroscopic realism per se we have seen that there are
three distinct broad kinds of theories: operational eigenstate mixture macroreal-
ism, operational eigenstate support macrorealism, and supra eigenstate support
macrorealism. It is only the first of these which is unable to account for potential
Leggett-Garg inequality violation.
The remaining two positions do not come without some price however. A
measurement that has been verified to be operationally non-disturbing for opera-
tional eigenstate preparations, turns out to be disturbing for preparations which
are not operational eigenstates. The operational eigenstate support macroscopic
realist must suppose that the measurement was perturbing the ontic states un-
derlying the operational eigenstate preparations after all, but in such a way as
previously to have been operationally undetectable. The supra eigenstate sup-
port macrorealist may continue to believe that the ontic states in the support
of eigenstate preparations were not disturbed by the measurement, but at the
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cost of having to introduce novel, albeit macrodefinite, ontic states in those cir-
cumstances when (according to quantum theory) superpositions are prepared.
Neither option is particularly welcome, at least if the appeal of macroscopic
realism was to be that the macroscopic properties of things continue to behave
in the same way when they are unobserved as they do when they are observed.
Leggett-Garg inequality violation therefore remains an interesting result, even
if it fails to rule out macroscopic realism per se.
Regarding the Leggett-Garg inequality itself we showed, first, that the in-
equality could be derived directly from some simple conditions pertaining to
whether or not one’s measurements were operationally disturbing. This deriva-
tion needed to make no mention of macroscopic realism, nor of any notion
of noninvasiveness stronger than non-disturbance at the statistical level. We
analysed Leggett and Garg’s arguments from the possibility of null-result mea-
surements to their conclusion, that noninvasiveness in a stronger sense than
operational non-disturbance was a natural corollary of the notion of macro-
scopic realism, and found that no such argument could be maintained without
appeal to potentially tendentious and model-dependent assumptions. It follows
that, for all their mathematical similarity, the Leggett-Garg inequalities and the
Bell-inequalities are not methodologically on a par. Unlike local causality, ontic
noninvasiveness cannot be motivated as a general feature which should exist for
at least some measurements when macroscopic realism obtains.
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10 Coda: The Leggett-Garg Inequality and the
Two-slit experiment
When it comes to introducing the concept of quantum superposition in lectures,
one almost invariably begins by appealing to the two-slit experiment, or related
interference phenomena, to argue that something distinctive and non-classical
must be happening. One tends to argue, roughly, that interference effects show
that one cannot understand what is happening in a two-slit experiment as the
quantum particle determinately going through one slit or determinately going
through the other, and we are just ignorant of which, since then we ought to have
a statistical mixture of the two cases, which is not what one sees on the detecting
screen. This then motivates the idea that in these experiments, the particle must
be enjoying some new way of being—dubbed superposition—in which it is not
the case that it determinately goes through one, or it determinately goes through
the other, slit. Perhaps one says that the particle’s spatial path through the
slits is indeterminate, or indefinite, or undefined, or that in some novel sense
the particle goes through both slits (but not by splitting in two!), or somesuch.
But whatever one says by way of positive characterisation of superposition, the
main point is that the observed interference pattern shows that the particle is
not determinately taking one or other of the options open to it. Slit-position for
the particle is not a value-definite quantity in these experiments, one concludes.
This argument is a venerable one, and it is also a very powerful and per-
suasive one. Nevertheless, it is possible that one might feel a slight twinge of
awkwardness or intellectual dishonesty when presenting it. One might hear a
small, quiet voice inside saying—how watertight is that argument really? Isn’t
it just a little bit too quick? How sure are we really that one couldn’t cook up
some kind of theory in which the particle always determinately went through
one slit or the other, but managed even so to give the correct interference-effect
statistics? One might even have the de Broglie-Bohm theory in mind as an
explicit example according to which the particle always really does go through
one or the other slit, yet one will still see the correct interference pattern.
Now, as others have also noted before (e.g., Benatti et al. (1994)), there are
in fact interesting connections between the Leggett-Garg inequality and these
venerable interference experiments. Violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality
in quantum theory involves preparing superposition states, and the refutation
of operational eigenstate mixture macrorealism, which such violation entails,
can be read as the implication that such superpositions cannot be understood
as statistical mixtures of eigenstates. These are therefore the same problems
which are presented in the traditional analysis of the two-slit experiment. But
we can now put things the other way around. Working backwards from our
detailed analysis of the Leggett-Garg inequality we can ask: What may one
truly infer from the two-slit experiment, if one is going to be careful about it?
10.1 The two-slit experiment
In the experiment, a quantum system at time t = t0 is prepared in a state,
ψ(x, t0), a wavepacket moving orthogonally to the x direction, towards a bar-
rier containing two narrow slits. When the wavepacket reaches the screen, at
time t = t1, its width in the x direction is much greater than the distance
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between the two slits, and it may reasonably be represented as a plane wave.
The (renormalised) portion of the wavepacket passing through the first slit is
ψ1(x, t1) and through the second slit ψ2(x, t1). Finally the two wavepackets
spread out on the other side of the barrier, before reaching a detection screen,
at time t = t2, where the x-position is observed. ψ1(x, t1) evolves into ψ1(x, t2)
and ψ2(x, t1) evolves into ψ2(x, t2)
The relative frequency with which the quantum object is detected at some
particular value of x is given by 12 |ψ1(x, t2) + ψ2(x, t2)|2.
If the first slit is blocked, the overall intensity is reduced by a half, and
the relative frequency becomes |ψ2(x, t2)|2, while if the second slit is blocked,
this becomes |ψ1(x, t2)|2. The problem is then traditionally presented in these
terms: if the quantum object passes through the first slit, it can’t know whether
or not the second slit is blocked, and so it should still arrive at the screen
with probability |ψ1(x, t2)|2. But equally if it passes through the second slit
it would be unaware of the status of the first slit, and so it should arrive at
the screen with probability |ψ2(x, t2)|2. So, given it has equal probability of
passing through either slit, when both slits are open, the detection probability
should be 12
(
|ψ1(x, t2)|2 + |ψ2(x, t2)|2
)
and not 12 |ψ1(x, t2) + ψ2(x, t2)|
2
. The
two terms differ by the quantity |ψ1(x, t2)| |ψ2(x, t2)| cos (φ(x)), where φ(x) is
the difference in phase between ψ1(x, t2) and ψ2(x, t2) at the location x.
If we now analyse this in terms of the Leggett–Garg inequality, the situation
corresponds to the simplified arrangement given at the end of the Appendix.
(To emphasise: quantum states ψ are here being taken to label equivalence
classes of preparation procedures, rather than ontic states.) The initial state,
ψ(x, t0) can be treated as an eigenstate of the operator Q1 with eigenvalue
+1. For the intermediate measurement, Q2, ψ1(x, t1) is assigned the eigenvalue
+1, corresponding to the system going through the first slit, and ψ2(x, t1) is
assigned −1, corresponding to the system going through the second slit. That
is, ψ1(x, t1) and ψ2(x, t1) are operational eigenstates for measurement of ‘which
slit?’. Finally, an arbitrary location x on the screen is given the value +1 for
the final measurement, Q3.
Under these value assignments,
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=+1, Q2=+1, Q3=+1) =
1
2
|ψ1(x, t2)|2
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=+1, Q2=−1, Q3=+1) =
1
2
|ψ2(x, t2)|2
P(M1,M3)(Q1=+1, Q3=+1) =
1
2
|ψ1(x, t2) + ψ2(x, t2)|2
The disturbance due to the intermediate measurement can then be quantified
as the difference between the sum of the first two of these and the last:
D2,+1,+1 = |ψ1(x, t2)| |ψ2(x, t2)| cos (φ(x)) .
It is straightforward to check that this results in the following Leggett–Garg
inequality:
〈Q+〉LG = 2 |ψ1(x, t2)| (|ψ1(x, t2)|+ |ψ2(x, t2)| cos (φ(x)))− 1. (11)
(See Appendix for the general definition of disturbance measures of this type,
and how the corresponding Leggett-Garg inequalities follow.) From this it
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follows that violation of the inequality 〈Q+〉LG ≥ −1 requires cos (φ(x)) <
− |ψ1(x, t2)| / |ψ2(x, t2)|.18
The equivalent condition to macroscopic realism, in this context, is that
there is always a matter of fact about which slit the quantum object passes
through, even with a superposition preparation. Operational non-disturbance
of the operational eigenstates of Q2 (i.e., of slit-position for the system) requires
verifying experimentally that, if the system is prepared in the state ψ1(x, t2), no
measurement localised in the vicinity of the second slit will affect the intensity on
the screen, which is indeed the case. The same holds for preparation in the state
ψ2(x, t2) and measurement at the first slit. (Recall that we have to establish
operational non-disturbance for the operational eigenstate preparations first in
order to be able to go on to reach any interesting conclusions whatsoever.) Null
result (thus ontically noninvasive) measurements correspond to measuring only
one slit at a time, then discarding the runs in which the system was detected at
that slit, and this effect is achieved exactly by blocking one or other of the slits.
This analysis of the two slit experiment, in the terms of the Leggett-Garg
inequality, both formalises and clarifies the normal analysis of quantum inter-
ferometry experiments. And as we now know, there is more than one kind of
view available which would insist that the system must always go through one
slit or the other:19
1. In operational eigenstate mixture macrorealism, each operational eigen-
state associated with a given slit corresponds to a distribution over a
set of non-contextually value-definite ontic states, and the superposition
preparation of the interference experiment must be described as a statis-
tical mixture of these distributions. Such a position cannot account for
the interference pattern or the attendant Leggett-Garg inequality viola-
tion. Violation of the operational non-disturbance condition is sufficient
to refute operational eigenstate mixture macrorealism, therefore, and this
happens whenever the interference term is non-negligible.
However, to repeat, operational eigenstate mixture macrorealism is not
the only way to believe that the quantum object always passes through
one slit or the other. For the condition of operational non-disturbance
to follow for superposition preparations, it is also necessary to believe
that measurements performed at one slit cannot be influencing the future
behaviour of quantum systems passing through the remote slit, even under
these different preparation conditions.
2. Operational eigenstate support macrocrealism holds that the superposition
preparation only accesses the same ontic states as the operational eigen-
states of slit position do, but that the introduction of the measurement
must disturb these ontic states, even in the case of null result measure-
ments. So, even when the system is prepared to be in ψ1(x, t1), the intro-
duction of a detector, or a blockage, in the second slit is in fact disturbing
the ontic state of the system, even if, with that preparation, one doesn’t
18An equivalent inequality can be violated for |ψ1(x, t2)| > |ψ2(x, t2)| by a different value
assignment for the intermediate measurement.
19 We put the options in terms of our three flavours of macroscopic realism, but for analysis
of the two-slit experiment, there is no need that the quantities involved be macroscopic, of
course. The point is rather that the quantities should be non-contextually value-definite,
which, as we have seen, is what a macroscopic realist requires of macroscopic quantities.
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see any evidence of that disturbance in terms of a shift in the pattern on
the detecting screen.
3. Supra eigenstate support macrorealism allows that the ontic states pre-
pared by ψ1(x) are not disturbed by a detector in front of the second slit.
However, the cost is to introduce novel ontic states for the preparation
(ψ1(x) + ψ2(x))/
√
2, which are available neither to ψ1(x) nor to ψ2(x).
These novel ontic states are all non-contextually value-definite, in that
they are associated with passing through one or the other slit, and reveal
which on measurement. But these novel ontic states all share the feature
that any such state which has the system passing through the first slit
will be disturbed by a detector placed in front of the second slit, and vice
versa.
So our venerable argument was too quick: there are two general families of
theories according to which a system definitely always goes through one slit or
the other, yet where an interference effect is displayed—i.e., where it makes a
difference what is going on at the other slit. The inference from i) there being
preparations which are not equivalent to a statistical mixture of operational
eigenstates for slit-position, to ii) there is not a fact about which slit the system
went through, is invalid. However, with that said, one can also see the appeal of
the venerable argument more clearly. In order to account for the experimental
results, the macroscopic realist—or the believer in ‘always definitely one slit or
the other!’—is forced, in one form or another, to accept that a quantum object
that is associated with passing through one slit, must nevertheless be affected by
a detector placed in the other20. The macroscopic realist cannot entirely avoid
the conclusion that, even if something goes through only one slit, its future
behaviour can have a lawlike dependence on what happend at the other slit.21
In some discussions of the two-slit experiment, one finds claims along the
lines that no plausible theory could be cooked-up which recovers the quantum
predictions whilst insisting that the particle only ever went through one or
other slit. But this forces one to enquire: what makes for plausibility? What is
hidden here? Our analysis, based on the Leggett-Garg inequality and our three-
way distinction between macroscopic realist positions, notes the strength of the
traditional argument, but it also shows exactly what space there is for alternative
accounts of interference effects which maintain the idea that the particle always
determinately goes through one slit or the other, whilst it also clearly flags the
20It is interesting that this is not restricted to detectors. Equivalent conclusions, by simply
introducing a phase shift in front of one of the slits, can be obtained from Hardy’s ontic state
indifference theorem (Hardy, 2013), noting that preparation support macrorealism is a form of
ψ-epistemic interpretation of quantum theory. The implications for supra eigenstate support
macrorealism also find parallels in the ‘surrealistic trajectories’ arguments surrounding de
Broglie–Bohm theory (Englert et al. (1992), Maroney (2002, Chpt. 3).
21With the two slit case, because one is dealing with a spatial separation between the slits,
it might be tempting to appeal to locality to motivate the thought that in this instance—if
not in general—we have good reason to suppose that a measurement at one slit should be
partially ontically noninvasive: should not affect a system located at the far slit. Locality is
certainly a strong component in the intuitive pull of the venerable argument. But notice that
this cannot be taken too far: there is no requirement that goings-on at one slit immediately
affect ontic states which are value-definite for the other slit. It is the future behaviour of the
system, in the overlap of the future light-cones of the two slits, which is affected, and this is
consistent with a local transmission of the influence—whatever it may be—from happenings
at the slit where the system wasn’t.
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costs of these approaches. In this there is considerable advantage. We have
moved from the sphere of the often implicit, the potentially subjective, and
the regularly tendentious—i.e., judgements of what is physically plausible—to
a clear and well-defined space of theories having certain explicit features.
What, finally, of the pedagogy, though? Well, no doubt there is consider-
able merit in sticking with the traditional line—at least for initial pedagogical
purposes: an initial, first-order approximation. But our analysis of how the
Leggett-Garg considerations apply in this case shows where one can immediately
point the discerning student, for higher-order corrections, or for an explanation
of what might, in these cases, be hidden behind the little (possibly weasel?)
word ‘plausible’.
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A Appendix: The role of operationally de-
tectable disturbance in violating the Leggett
Garg Inequality
To draw out the role of operationally detectable disturbances in violating the
Leggett Garg Inequality, it helps to introduce a few simple expressions. Starting
with the marginal statistics for the experimental arrangement when all three
measurements M1,M2,M3 are performed:
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=qi, Q2=qj) =
∑
qk
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=qi, Q2=qj , Q3=qk)(12)
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q2=qj , Q3=qk) =
∑
qi
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=qi, Q2=qj , Q3=qk)(13)
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=qi, Q3=qk) =
∑
qj
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=qi, Q2=qj , Q3=qk).(14)
it is useful to define:
D1,qj ,qk = P(M2,M3)(Q2=qj , Q3=qk)− P(M1,M2,M3)(Q2=qj, Q3=qk)
D2,qi,qk = P(M1,M3)(Q1=qi, Q3=qk)− P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=qi, Q3=qk)
(15)
to quantify the change in marginal statistics of M2,M3, depending on whether
M1 is measured, and in the marginal statistics ofM1,M3 depending one whether
M2 is measured.
If the introduction of the M1 measurement cannot be detectable by an ob-
server who only has access to the marginal statistics of M2,M3, then all of
D1,qj ,qk = 0. Similarly, if the introduction of the M2 measurement is unde-
tectable with only the marginal statistics of M1,M3, then all of D2,qi,qk = 0.
An equivalently defined D3,qi,qj must all be zero to avoid signalling backwards
in time.
Now, looking at each term in the Leggett Garg Inequality, when all three
measurements are performed:
〈Q1Q2〉M1M2M3 = P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=+1, Q2=+1) + P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=−1, Q2=−1)
−P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=+1, Q2=−1)− P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=−1, Q2=+1)
〈Q1Q3〉M1M2M3 = P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=+1, Q3=+1) + P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=−1, Q3=−1)
−P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=+1, Q3=−1)− P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=−1, Q3=+1)
〈Q2Q3〉M1M2M3 = P(M1,M2,M3)(Q2=+1, Q3=+1) + P(M1,M2,M3)(Q2=−1, Q3=−1)
−P(M1,M2,M3)(Q2=+1, Q3=−1)− P(M1,M2,M3)(Q2=−1, Q3=+1)
(16)
A straightforward rearrangement yields the very simple form
〈Q〉M1M2M3 = 4
(
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=+1, Q2=+1, Q3=+1)+
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=−1, Q2=−1, Q3=−1)
)− 1 (17)
showing clearly that the Leggett-Garg Inequality cannot be violated.
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When only pairs of measurements are performed:
〈Q1Q2〉M1M2 = P(M1,M2)(Q1=+1, Q2=+1) + P(M1,M2)(Q1=−1, Q2=−1)
−P(M1,M2)(Q1=+1, Q2=−1)− P(M1,M2)(Q1=−1, Q2=+1)
〈Q1Q3〉M1M3 = P(M1,M3)(Q1=+1, Q3=+1) + P(M1,M3)(Q1=−1, Q3=−1)
−P(M1,M3)(Q1=+1, Q3=−1)− P(M1,M3)(Q1=−1, Q3=+1)
〈Q2Q3〉M2M3 = P(M2,M3)(Q2=+1, Q3=+1) + P(M2,M3)(Q2=−1, Q3=−1)
−P(M2,M3)(Q2=+1, Q3=−1)− P(M2,M3)(Q2=−1, Q3=+1)
(18)
and it can now be easily seen that if
〈Q〉LG = 〈Q1Q2〉M1M2 + 〈Q1Q3〉M1M3 + 〈Q2Q3〉M2M3 (19)
then
〈Q〉LG−〈Q〉M1M2M3 =

 ∑
qj=qk
D1,qj ,qk +
∑
qj=qk
D2,qi,qk

−

∑
qj 6=qk
D1,qj ,qk +
∑
qj 6=qk
D2,qi,qk


(20)
This can be simplified by noting that
∑
qj ,qk
D1,qj ,qk =
∑
qi,qk
D2,qi,qk = 0, and
it follows that
〈Q〉LG = 4
(
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=+1, Q2=+1, Q3=+1) + P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=−1, Q2=−1, Q3=−1)
)
+2

∑
qj=qk
D1,qj ,qk +
∑
qj=qk
D2,qi,qk

− 1 (21)
For the Leggett Garg Inequality to be violated it is a necessary condition that
at least one of the set D1,qj ,qk , D2,qi,qk be non-zero
22. At least one of the M1
or M2 measurements must introduce a disturbance which is detectable in the
marginal statistics of the other two measurements.
The expression above suggests that a simpler form is possible, obtained by
preparing the system to actually be in a operational eigenstate of M1, with
the value Q1 = +1. In this case all D1,qj ,qk = 0. As P (Q1 = −1) = 0 for
any measurements on such an initial preparation, it will also be the case that
P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1 = −1, Q2 = −1, Q3 = −1) = 0 and that D2,−1,qk = 0. This
produces
〈Q+〉LG = 2D2,+1,+1 + 4P(M1,M2,M3)(Q1=+1, Q2=+1, Q3=+1)− 1 (22)
This simplified inequality applies to an experimental arrangement where the
system is prepared in some state, there is a choice of whether measurement M2
takes place, then measurement M3 is always performed. If the introduction of
M2 does not affect the statistics of the M3 measurement, then D2,+1,+1 = 0
and the Leggett-Garg inequality cannot be violated.
22It is not a sufficient condition. Di, qj , qk may be non-zero (and hence operational eigen-
state mixture macrorealism be ruled out, see Section 7.1) even if the associated Leggett–Garg
Inequality holds.
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